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THE FINANCING ASSIGNEE
AND THE CONTRACT FOR SALE
IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA t
BENJAMIN GEVA *
Modern commercial law views the right to money due under a contract as
a property right.' Accordingly, a financing assignee, or an assignee of money
due under a contract, is a purchaser of property. This view is consistent with
general commercial concepts and provides a comprehensive framework gov-
erning the assignee's position towards the assignor and third parties. Property
analysis alone, however, does not fully explain the effect of the assignment on
the obligor. A central thesis of this article is that insofar as the obligor is con-
cerned, the financing assignee is a mere agent for collection of the money due
under the contract. Therefore, the assignment of money due under a contract
does not affect the personal relationship between its original parties. The dual
characterization of the assignee as both a purchaser and an agent, stems from
the nature of the assigned contract. As any other chose in action; the contract is
"property" in the hands of its owner. At the same time it is an "obligatory" or
personal relationship between the parties to it. "Purchase" of the right to the
money due under the assigned contract cannot affect the obligor's rights and
duties under the contract.
It has been stated "that if a man does take an assignment of a chose in ac-
tion he must take his chance as to the exact position in which the party giving it
stands. " 2 This article is concerned with the validity of this statement, or more
specifically with the "exact position" of a financing assignee in relation to the
financed contract for sale. 3 To some extent the financer steps into the seller's
shoes; the question is how far. The answer involves the consideration of such
issues as what rights and remedies of the seller are available to the financer,
and to which of the buyer's claims and defenses he is subject. This article ex-
amines these questions in the context of receivables financing. The goal of the
article is to explain the relationship between the financing assignee and the
obligor under common law and modern legislation in the United States and
Canada. The "agent for collection" theory that will be suggested is neither a
t Copyright © 1982 by Benjamin Geva.
* Associate Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto;
LL.B. Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1970; LL.M. Harvard University, 1975; S.J.D. Har-
vard University, 1980; Visiting Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago, 1976-77; Visiting
Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois, 1980-81. The author acknowledges with great
gratitude the research assistance of Christopher Moes of the 1982 Osgoode Hall graduating class.
1 See text and notes at notes 40-45 infra.
• Mangles v. Dixon, (1852) 3 H.L.C. 702, 735, 10 Eng. Rep. 278 (per Lord St.
Leonards) (emphasis added). "The conventional metaphor is that the assignee stands in the
assignor's shoes." 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 1089 (1965).
3 For a definition of "financing assignee", see text at note 20 infra. For "financing"
and "sale" see text and notes at notes 6-9 infra.
665
666	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:665
challenge nor an alternative to the modern "property" theory governing the
assignment of money due under a contract. It is rather an exposition of the in-
herent limitations of the property theory and an attempt to provide a comple-
ment to its operation.
The article begins by outlining the commercial setting. Financing assign-
ment practices are described in the context of sale financing devices in general.
The second section contains an explanation of the financing assignee's position
in relation to the buyer-obligor under the common law and the survival of this
position under modern commerical law legislation in the United States* and
Canada. 5 Specifically, the extent to which the assignee is subject to the contrac-
tual defenses of the obligor will be examined in the context of both the tradi-
tional property analysis and the suggested agent for collection analysis. Next,
the more difficult questions of what remedies of the original contract the
assignee can avail himself of, as well as what modifications to the contract he is
subject to, will be examined. The viability of the obligor's restitutionary claim
against the assignee for payments made under a mistake of fact will also be con-
sidered. It will be submitted that the conceptual framework which best explains
the assignee-obligor relationship is that of the assignee as an agent of the
assignor for collection of money due under the contract.
The third section examines the use of the negotiable instrument and the
waiver of defense, or cut off clause in both countries as devices circumventing a
major aspect of the common law position with respect to the financing assignee-
obligor relationship. In addition, this section analyzes the major aspects of
judicial and legislative responses to these devices and the effect of the legislative
responses on the common law scheme which governs the assignee-obligor's
relationship.
I. SALE FINANCING AND THE FINANCING ASSIGNEE
As a legal concept, "sale financing" has not acquired a well-defined
meaning. 6 An examination of existing sale financing practices' reveals that the
concept denotes the making of advances to a seller of goods by a third party to a
4 Under the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), 1962 as well as 1972 Official
Texts. Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent references to the U.C.C. are to the 1972 ver-
sion.
5 Under Personal Property Security Acts (P.P.S.A.) of Ontario, ONT. REV. STAT.
1980, c. 375 (as amended), Manitoba MAN. REV. STAT. 1973, c.5/P35 (as amended), and
Saskatchewan, SASK. REV. STAT. 1980, c. P-6.1 (as amended) as well as under the P.P.S.A.
draft bill of British Columbia. The P.P.S.A. is modeled on Article 9 of the U.C.C. Unless stated
otherwise, all P.P.S.A. citations in this article refer to the Ontario statute.
6 The following leading law dictionaries do not contain a definition of either "financ-
ing" or "sale financing:" BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969); BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY (rev. 4th ed. 1968); BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d rev. 1914 & Baldwin Century
ed. 1946). The definition of "financing" in 16A WORDS AND PHRASES (1959 & Supp. 1981) is
not helpful. "Financing" under WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED (1976), is "the act, process or an instance of raising or pro-
viding funds." Id. at 851.
7 See text and notes at notes 10-14 infra.
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sales transaction,8 known as a "financer" or "financing agency." 9 The ad-
vances may be made either in performance or in acceleration of the buyer's obliga-
tion to pay the price under the contract for sale.
Advances are made in performance of the buyer's obligation when they are
payable to the seller under an obligation of the financer procured by the buyer
in pursuance to his duty under the contract for sale. The financer's obligation
is embodied in either a negotiable instrument or a letter of credit. The former is
a writing signed by the financer that "contain[s] an unconditional promise or
order to pay a sum certain in money" to the order of the seller." Such a
negotiable instrument usually takes the form of a bill of exchange or a draft"
drawn either on a bank' 2 or on the drawer himself, and is used primarily in the
financing of retail purchases. A letter of credit in the context of sales financing
is an engagement by its issuer to pay the price of goods sold or to accept a draft
drawn by the seller to that amount, provided that the shipping documents
representing the goods are tendered to the issuer. Letters of credit are used
primarily in commerce between distant parties."
Advances made in acceleration of the buyer's obligation are procured by
the seller of the goods. The advances made by the financer to the seller reflect
the present market value of the right to obtain the sales price of the goods. Such
is the case in receivables financing, where the obligations of customers towards
retailers are converted to cash, thereby giving a seller who sells his inventory on
credit terms the equivalent of a sale on cash terms." This is also the case in
0 The essence of a sales transaction is the passage of title to goods from a seller to a
buyer for a price. U.C.C. S 2-106(1); Ontario Sale of Goods Act, ONT. REV. STAT. 1980 c.462;
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 1133.
9 Cf. definition of "financing agency" in U.C.C. S 2-104(2):
a bank, finance company or other person who in the ordinary course of
business makes advances against goods or documents of title or who by ar-
rangement with either the seller or the buyer intervenes in ordinary course to
make or collect payment due or claimed under the contract for sale . , .
due or claimed under the contract for sale ...
Id. " 'Financing agency' is broadly defined ... to cover every normal instance in which a party
aids or intervenes in the financing of a sales transaction." U.C.C. 5 2-506 comment (1). Note,
however, that in its first part the definition fails to mention that the financing agency must be a
third party to the sales transaction and that in its last part the definition seems to cover also debt
collection unaccompanied by previous advances. The definition is thus overbroad.
'° U.C.C. 5 3-104(1). See also Bills of Exchange Act, CAN. REV. STAT. 1970, c.B-5 (as
amended) ss. 17(1) (bill of exchange defined) and 176(1) (definition of a promissory note). The
instrument could originally be payable to the buyer and then endorsed to the seller.
" "A writing which complies with the requirements of this section is ... a 'draft' ('bill
of exchange') if it is an order..." U.C.C. S 3-104(2). See also definition of "bill of exchange" in s.
17(1) of the Canadian Bills of Exchange Act, CAN. REV. STAT. 1970 c.B-5 (as amended).
" 'Bank' means any person engaged in the business of banking." U.C.C. S
1-201(4). It is narrower than "financing agency" under 5 2-104(2). See note 9 supra. Under 5 2
of the Canadian Bills of Exchange Act, CAN. REV. STAT. 1970 c.B-5 (as amended), "bank" is "an
incorporated bank or savings bank carrying on business in Canada." This is narrower than the
Code definition.
Letters of credit are covered by Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code. For their
use in sales financing, see Wiley, How to Use Letters of Credit in Financing the Sale of Goods, 20 Bus.
LAW. 495 (1965).
14 "Receivables" are the obligations of customers towards retailers. See, Kripke, Con-
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documentary sales financing, where a distant buyer is to pay the price of goods
shipped to him upon the arrival of the seller's documentary draft at the present-
ing bank. The seller, rather than sending the draft for collection and then
waiting for the arrival of its proceeds at the depositary bank, may at the outset
discount the draft with the depositary bank thereby accelerating payment."
Where the advances are made in performance of the buyer's obligation,
the financer enforces a separate and independent obligation against the buyer.
The financer, therefore, is neither entitled to any of the seller's rights and
remedies nor is he subject to any of the defenses available against him." Where
the advances are made by the financer in acceleration of the buyer's obligation
to pay the price of goods sold, however, the financer enforces the buyer's
original promise under the contract of sale. In such instances, the extent to
which the financer stands in the shoes of the seller can be critical to the resolu-
tion of disputes between the obligor and the financer. This article focuses on
advances in acceleration of the buyer's obligation, such as accounts receivable
financing.
Receivables or book debts are "debts due to the trader in the course of his
trade, ... which in the ordinary course of his business would be entered in his
book. " 17 Receivables which are buyers' unsecured obligations are known as
"accounts."I 8 When secured, the receivables are "chattel paper. " 19 A transac-
ceptual Obsolescence in Law and Accounting—Finance Relations between Retailer and Assignee of Retail
Receivables, I B.C. IND. & Com. L. REV. 55 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Kripke, Conceptual Ob-
solescence]. For receivables financing, see Kripke, Financial Assistance Through Commercial and Sales
Finance Companies, Leasing Companies, Factors and Field Warehousing, 14 Bus, LAW. 902, 905-07
(1959) [hereinafter cited as Kripke, Financial Assistance].
15 "Draft" is a negotiable instrument which is an order. U.0 ,C. 	 3-104(2)(a).
"Documentary draft" is any negotiable or non-negotiable draft accompanying documents,
securities or other papers to be delivered against honor of the draft. U.C.C. 4-104(1)(f), Cf.
U.C.C. S 5-103(1)(b). Collection of documentary drafts is dealt with in Part 5 of Article 4 of the
Code. For documentary sales and their financing, see Farnsworth, Documentary Drafts Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 22 Bus. LAW. 479 (1967). No specific statutory provisions govern the
collection or financing of documentary drafts in Canada.
16 Whether the buyer can use a defense under the sale contract as a basis for enjoining
the financer from making the advances to the seller who delivered the goods to him in reliance on
the financer's obligation is discussed in Geva, Contractual Defenses as Claims to the Instrument: The
Right to Block Payment on a Banker's Instrument, 58 OR. L. REV. 283 (1979).
" Shipley v. Marihall, (1863) 32 L.J.C.P. 258, 259, 14 C.B. (N.S.) 566, 143 ENG.
REP. 567 (per Willes, J., during argument cited with approval in Re Paddle River Constr. Ltd.,
(1961) 35 W.W.R. 605, 614 (Alta. S.C.) (per Greschuk, J.)). See also Official Receiver v. Tailby,
(1886) 56 L.J.Q. B. 30, at 33 (C.A.) (per Lord Esher, M.R.); Re Alna Mf. Ltd., (1963) 4 C.B.R.
(N.S.) 167, at 168 (Ont. S.C.).
' 8 The term is adopted by U.C.C. S 9-106. In its 1962 version, the section distin-
guished between "contract right" (right to payment under "a contract not yet earned by
performance . . .") and "account" ("right to payment for goods sold . . ."). The distinction was
abandoned in 1972: "An 'Account' means any right to payment for goods sold . . . whether or
not it has been earned by performance." All definitions exclude chattel paper (defined in text and
note at note 19 supra). "Accounts" do not constitute a specific type of collateral under the
classification of the Ontario P.P.S.A., rather they form a part of the "intangibles" class. See s.
1(m): 'intangible' means all personal property including those choses in action, that is not goods,
chattel paper, documents of title, instruments or securities." ONT. REV. STAT. 1980, c.375 (as
amended), s. 1(m).
19 "Chattel paper" is defined in U.C.C.	 9-105(1)(b) and P.P.S.A. s. 1(c). This
category covers one or more writings embodying a security agreement and a monetary obliga-
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tion between a seller and a third party in which receivables are transferred is
called an assignment." The assignment by the seller of receivables against
funds advanced by a financer is a financing assignment. In this transaction the
financer is a financing assignee.
A financing assignment of receivables can arise as security for a loan or as
an outright sale." An outright sale can be with or without recourse." If the sale
is without recourse, the financer cannot recover from the assignor in the event
the buyer, known as the "obligor," or "account debtor," 23 defaults. A sale
can also be with or without notification to the buyer of goods. If the buyer is
notified, a direct collection or notification arrangement results; an indirect col-
lection or non-notification arrangement results if the obligor is not informed of
the assignment." Due to the "resulting opportunities for fraud or for credit
reasons," non-notification arrangements are typically with recourse." Func-
tionally, they resemble a transfer for security," where the obligor is usually not
notified of the assignment, and the risk of non-payment is borne by the seller of
goods (the assignor of the receivables)."
The sale of accounts under a notification arrangement without recourse is
known as "factoring. " 28 It originated "in the field of textiles, but . . . has
recently been extended to allied lines of clothing and fabrics, and even into en-
tirely different lines such as furniture." 29 The practice of factoring is more
prevalent in the United States than in Canada where the usual assignment of
accounts occurs as security for a loan. 30 Assignment of chattel paper resulting
in notification as well as non-notification arrangements are common occur-
rences. Notification arrangements are typically found in the automobile field
while the non-notification ones are widespread in the furniture field."
tion. A pre-U.C.C. and pre-P.P.S.A. term for a secured contract for sale is "conditional sale
contract" (see reference in U.C.C. 5 9-102(2) and P.P.S.A. s. 2(a)(i)).
2° Cf. U.C.C. 5 9-318; P.P.S.A. s. 40 (recognizing the existence of the power to assign
receivables and regulating the rights of the assignee and the account debtor). Obviously, this is
only one use of the term assignment.
21 For a discussion as to the difference between the two modes of financing assignment,
see Norton v. National Bank of Commerce of Pine Bluff, 240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966).
22 The effect of a recourse arrangement can be achieved by a repurchase arrangement.
Repurchase can be full, limited or optional. For a discussion of the categories of dealer-financer
agreements, see Shuchman, Profit on Default: An Archival Study of Automobile Repossession and Resale,
22 STAN. L. REV. 20, 25 (1969).
23 The term "account debtor" is used by the U.C.C. and the P.P.S.A.; see U.C.C. 5
9-105(a); P.P.S.A. s. 1(b).
24 See Official Comment to U.C.C. 9-308 (Comment (1) in the 1972 version). The
practice of not notifying the obligor-buyer of the assignment was held not to be a deceptive trade
practice in Director of Trade Practices v. Household Fin. Corp. of Can., [1977] 3 W.W.R. 390
(B.C.C.A.).
25 Kripke, Financial Assistance, supra note 14, at 907.
" See Kripke, Conceptual Obsolescence, supra note 14, at 56-57. The characterization of an
arrangement as a transfer for security or a recourse outright sale is not always easy. See, e.g. , Ma-
jor's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1979).
27 As to the seller's risk, cf. Norton, supra note 21, at 147-49, 398 S.W.2d at 541.
25 Kripke, Financial Assistance, supra note 14, at 906.
29 Id.
3° For banking arrangements in Canada, see generally Johnson, Accounts Receivable Financ-
ing in Canada: Nature of the Charge and Rights of Priority, 15 U.B.C.L. Rev. 88, 91-94 (1981).
31 U.C.C. 5 9-308 Official Comment 1 (1972 version).
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The financing assignment of receivables is governed in the various United
States jurisdictions by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). 32
The modern statute governing the subject in the common law provinces of
Canada is the Personal Property Security Act (P.P. S.A.)." Both statutes pro-
vide for the assignee's right when "so agreed" with the assignor, and "in any
event" on the latter's default, to notify the obligor "to make payment to him
the assignee] whether or not the assignor was theretofore making
collections." 34
 Until notified, the obligor is to pay the assignor. 35 Thus,
notification establishes the direct relationship between the financing assignee
and the obligor." Regardless of the type of financing assignment involved,
notification gives rise to the question of the financer's "exact position" in rela-
tion to the financed contract for sale."
II. THE FINANCING ASSIGNEE AND THE OBLIGOR: THE GENERAL LAW
A. An Assignee Takes the Contract Subject to the Obligor's Defenses
Assignment of choses in action" was first recognized by courts of equity."
"At common law, a debt was looked upon as a strictly personal obligation, and an
assignment of it was regarded as a mere assignment of a right to bring an action
at law against the debtor. " 4° Courts of law, therefore, prohibited assignment of
32 Besides applying "to any transaction
	
which is intended to create a security in-
terest in ... chattel paper or accounts," Article 9 explicitly applies "to any sale of accounts or
chattel paper." U.C.C. 5 9-102(1). Exclusions in 9-104 relate to "certain transfers ... which,
by their nature, have nothing to do with commercial financing transactions." U.C.C. 5 9-104
comment 6. (Citations to $ 9-102 are from the 1972 version; the 1962 version includes a reference
also to "contract rights;" cf. note 18 supra.).
33 The P.P.S.A. applies to "every transaction 	 that in substance creates a security
interest," as well as "to every assignment of book debts not intended as security ..." ONT.
REV. STAT. 1980, ch. 375 (as amended), s. 2. Statutes which govern financing assignments of
receivables in non-P.P.S.A. jurisdictions (e.g., Assignment of Book Debts Acts) are concerned
only with the effect of non-registration of the assignment on third parties. All other aspects have
remained "as if the Act had never been passed," Snyder's Ltd. v. Furniture Fin. Corp. Ltd., 66
ONT.L.R. 79, 86 (1930).
34 U.C.C. 5 9-502(1) (This provision is titled "Collection Rights of Secured Party,"
but "secured party" includes the person to whom accounts or chattel paper has been sold.
U.C.C. 5 9-105(m).); P.P.S.A. s. 57 (1)(a).
35 U.C.C. 5 9-318(3); P.P.S.A. s. 40(2).
36 In equity, notification determines priorities between competing bona fide assignees.
Dearle v. Hall, 3 Russ. 1, 38 Eng. Rep. 475 (1823). In common law Canada this rule had sur-
vived up to the enactment of the P.P.S.A. Cf. Snyder's Ltd. v. Furniture Fin. Corp. Ltd., 66
ONT. L.R. 79, 86 (1930). It is still in force in non-P.P.S.A. jurisdictions.
37 See text and note at note 2 supra.
38 "Chose in action is a known legal expression used to describe all personal rights of
property which can only be claimed or enforced by action, and not by taking physical
possession," Torkington v. Magee [1902] 2 K.B. 427, 430 (per Channel!, J.). "In its primary
sense, the term ... includes all rights which are enforceable by action — rights to debts of all
kinds, and rights of action on a contract ..." Holdsworth, The History of the Treatment of Choses in
Action by the Common Law, 33 HARV. L. REV. 997 (1920). -
'B According to G. CHESHIRE & C. FIFOOT, LAW OF CONTRACT 494 (Furmston 9th
ed. 1976), this recognition goes back to the beginning of the seventeenth century. Barbour traced
it back to the begining of the fifteenth century: Barbour, The History of Contract in Early English
Equity in 4 OXFORD STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 108 (P. Vinogradoff ed. 1914).
49
 Fitzroy v. Cave [1905] 2 K.B. 364, 372 (per Cozens-Hardy, L.J.) (emphasis added).
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choses in action." Courts of equity viewed this resistance to assignability as
"too absurd . . . to adopt."'" The latter courts "admitted the title of an
assignee of a debt, regarding it as a piece of property, an asset capable of being
dealt with like any other asset . . . "43 This position gained a limited statutory
recognition" and finally made its way into modern commercial law
legislation."
The assignment of a chose in action has never been held to prejudice the
position of the obligor. "The assignee ... can acquire no greater rights under
the assignment than those enforceable by the assignor, and he, therefore, takes
subject to all defenses existing in respect of the right assigned which would be
available against the assignor seeking to enforce the right assigned. '46 A
leading authority for this proposition is Newfoundland v. Newfoundland Railway
Company. 47
 In that case, a railway company undertook to complete the con-
struction of a railway." Payments were attached to the progress of the work;
each payment was to be made by the obligor upon the completion of a
designated section of the railroad." The railway company completed a portion
of the line and broke the contract." An assignee of a division of the railway
sued the obligor for the payment attached to the construction of that division. 5 '
Though this part of the railway had been completed," the assignee did not
prevail. His entitlement to payment could not be separated from the obligor's
claim for the damage caused by the railway company's breach."
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, a court of last appeal for
colonies and dominions in the British Empire, understood the assignee to argue
" The objections to assignability of choses in action at common law are summarized by
W.R. WARREN, THE LAW RELATING To CHOSES IN ACTION 31-32 (1899). They include
maintenance, the duty of a debtor to seek out his creditor and the completion of the transfer of
ownership by physical delivery.
42
 Master v. Miller (1791) 4 T.R. 320, 340, 100 Eng. Rep. 1042.
43
 Fitzroy v. Cave [1905] 2 K.B. at 372 (emphasis added).
4* Originally in s. 25(6) of the English Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., 66. The
provision covers "[a]ny absolute assignment by writing ... (not purporting to be by way of
charge only) of any debt or other legal chose in action of which express notice in writing shall
have been given to the debtor. . . ." Id. "The statute has not altered the law in substance. It is
merely machinery," G. CHESHIRE & C. FIFOOT, supra note 39, at 500. Most notably the statute
gave the assignee a right at law and thus enabled him to sue in his own name.
45 See text and notes at notes 32-37.
45
 1 F. T. WHITE & O.D. TUDOR, A SELECTION OF LEADING CASES IN EQUITY 142
(Whittake, 8th ed. 1910). See also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS 167(1) (1932): "An
assignee's right against the obligor is subject to all limitations of the obligee's right, to all absolute
and temporary defenses thereto, and to all set-offs and counterclaims of the obligor which would
have been available against the obligee had there been no assignment . . ." Id. The phraseology
of the Restatement (in particular, the use of "limitations," and the "absolute"—"temporary"
dichotomy) is criticized by 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 1089.
47 (1888) 13 App. Cas. 199 (P.C.).
48
 Id. at 202.	 •
49
 Paragraph 14 of the contract, id. at 204, as construed by the court, id. at 208-09.
5°
 Id, at 206.
51
 Id. at 202.
52 Id.
" Id. at 212-13.
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in that case that "when a debt or claim under a contract has been assigned
...the debt or claim is so severed from the rest of the contract that the assignee
may hold it free from any counterclaim in respect of other terms of the same
contract. " 54
 It rejected the argument unequivocally:
It would be a lamentable thing if it were found to be the law that a party to a
contract may assign a portion of it, perhaps a beneficial portion, so that the
assignee shall take the benefit, wholly discharged of any counterclaim by
the other party in respect of the rest of the contract , which may be burden-
some. 55
Under Newfoundland Railway, then, an assignee cannot claim from an
obligor that which the assignor himself was not rightly entitled to under the
terms of the assigned contract.
It has been often stated that for the obligor's defenses to be available
against the assignee, they must arise from facts which "occurred before notice
of the assignment was given to [him]. " 56 This phrase, however, applies only in
conjunction with defenses arising outside the contractual nexus between the
obligor and the assignor such as from a separate contract between them. As to
defenses arising from the assigned contract, notice of assignment is entirely ir-
relevant. 57 As provided by both the U.C.C. and the P.P.S.A., an assignee is
subject to "all the terms of the contract ...and any defense or claim arising
therefrom."" No reference is made in this context to the notice of the assign-
ment. Notice, however, is relevant in cutting off "any other [unaccrued]
defense or claim" arising outside the assigned contract."
While the obligor may make use of some of the claims and defenses
available against the assignor, such rights can be asserted only defensively
against a financing assignee. "The assignee who comes in to finance the trans-
action, does not thereby become responsible for the assignor's warranties or
prospective performance. " 6° Some deviation from this proposition occurred at
54 Id. at 210.
55 Id. at 212 (per Lord Hobhouse).
56 F.D. WHITE & O.D. TUDOR, supra note 46, at 142. This is also the position of the
American Restatement of Contracts, RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS 5 167(1) (1932).
" See generally G. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 1090-91. Professor Gilmore has noted:
The Code improves on the Restatement by the device of distinguishing between
what might be called the contract-related and the unrelated defenses and claims.
Defenses and claims "arising" from the contract can be asserted against the
assignee whether they "arise" before or after notification. As we shall see, that is
presumably what the restaters meant: the contingencies of future performance of
the contract were to be regarded as "facts existing at the time of the assignment."
Under the Code, "any other defense or claim" is available against the assignee
only if it "accrues before ... notification."
Id. Such "contract-related" defenses include breach of warranty, non-performance, and frustra-
tion. Id. at 1091-1106.
58 U.C.C. 5 9-318(1)(a); P.P.S.A. s. 40(1)(a).
" U.C.C.	 9-318(1)(6); P.P.S.A. s. 40(1)(b).
6° G. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 1092. See also Garner & Dunham, FTC Rule 433 and the
Uniform Commercial Code: An Analysis of Current Lender Status, 43 Mo. L. REV. 199, 229-30 (1978).
Professor Littlefield speaks of "a substantial body of commercial law which makes a distinction
between financing a transaction and participating in it as a party." Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase
of Consumer Paper: The Failure of the Subjective Test, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 48, 69 (1966).
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the turn of the century in the context of the indorsement and delivery of a bill of
lading by a financing bank." Nonetheless, this deviation was soon "repudiated
by the court of its inception and buried beneath an avalanche of adverse
criticism. " 62
The absence of affirmative liability on the part of the financing assignee is
consistent with the fact that an assignee of a chose in action does not undertake
the performance of the assigned contract. Rather, the assignee takes the benefit
of the contract, as may be reduced by its burdens. 63 The obligor "has no claim
to recover anything against the [assignee]; he only meets the [assignee's] claim
by counterclaim of damages arising out of the same contract. " 64 The obligor
"meets the assignee's claim by counterclaim" by offsetting 65 or recouping" the
amount of the counterclaim against the claim of the assignee. This neither in-
volves the filing of a counterclaim by the obligor" nor does it entail the
assignee's affirmative liability." Rather it means the assertion of the assignor's
breach, and the amount of any claim arising therefrom, in the obligor's defense
against the assignee's action.
The assignee's position towards the obligor's defenses could be explained
fully by regarding the chose in action in his hands as his "piece of property. "69
The assignee's subjection to the obligor's defenses is thus one aspect of the
" Landa v. Lattin, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 246, 46 S.W. 48 (1898). In this case a seller of
wheat in a documentary sales transaction discounted the draft (drawn on the buyer) with the
depositary bank. Id. at 247, 46 S.W. at 49. (For this practice see text and note at note 15 supra). It
was held that by taking the bill of lading relating to the wheat as security for the advance, the
depositary bank had become the owner of the wheat responsible to the buyer for its quality. 19
Tex. Civ. App. at 252-53, 46 S.W. at 52.
62 Note, The Tripartite Ownership Resulting from the Transfer of a Bill of Lading to Seller's Order
to a Discounting Bank, 26 COLUM. L. REV. 63 (1926). See also Note, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 87 (1909);
Note, 16 HARV. L. REV. 292 (1903). U.C.C. § 7-508 explicitly rejects this deviation in connec-
tion with documentary sales.
63 For case law supporting this proposition, see Loegler v. C.V. Hill & Co., 238 Ala.
606, 608-09, 193 So. 120, .121 (1940).
64 Young v. Kitchin, (1888) 3 Ex. D. 127, 131 (per Cleasby, B.).
66 The term "set off" is used here in the sense of "equitable set off." Cf. note 299 infra.
For the use of "set off" in the present context, see Newfoundland v. Newfoundland R. Co.
(1888) 13 App. Cas. 199, 213 (P.C.).
66 This term is used in American law.
Recoupment . . . although frequently confused with set-off, is recognized as a
distinct principle, namely, the right to present in opposition to the plaintiff's
claim, for its reduction or extinguishment, a right of action in the defendant for
loss or damage sustained by him in the same transaction through [the other
party's] breach of contract or duty. . . .
Loyd, The Development of Set-Off, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 563 (1916).
67 But see D.P.C. Corp. v. Jobson, 15 A.D.2d 861, 224 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1962), where a
buyer was allowed to interpose a counterclaim against a financing assignee up to the amount of the
assignee's demand. It is submitted that the court erred on this point.
68 Cf. U.C.C. 9-317. See Pendarvis v. G.M.C., 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 457, 459 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1969), a post-Code case holding the financing assignee not liable on the assigned con-
tract. But cf. Benton State Bank v. Warren, 263 Ark. 1, 562 S.W.2d 74 (1978) (assignee's liability
in specific circumstances determined on the basis of either bad faith or some kind of a duty of
care). Some reliance in that case was erroneously put on U.C.C. 9-318(1)(a). See 263 Ark. at 5,
562 S.W.2d at 76.
69 See text and note at note 42 supra.
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maxim, nemo dal pod non habet. The assignor could not convey more than what
he had — a right to payment subject to his performance. Likewise, the rule that
the assignee is not liable for the assignor's breach of the assigned contract could
stem from the absence of any contractual relationship between the obligor and
the assignee, i.e., from the fact that the assignee owns the right to payment
under the contract but is not a party owing a duty to perform it. Also in the
framework of "property" analysis, the assignee's subjection to external off-
sets 7° arising prior to notifying the obligor of the assignment could be explained
either by the equitable origin of the assignee's title" or by the assignee's partial
title up to notification."
While property analysis aids an understanding of the assignee's position
vis-a-vis the obligor's defenses, it does not convey the entire effect of the assign-
ment on the assignor-obligor's ongoing contractual relationship." Indeed, the
extent to which the assignee "steps into the assignor's shoes" in exercising
remedies under the contract, as well as in being entitled to receive notices
thereunder," remains unanswered. "Property" analysis further fails to ex-
plain satisfactorily the position of the assignee with respect to subsequent
modification of the contract by the original parties thereto." The "property"
analysis is also responsible for the confusion regarding the obligor's alleged
restitutionary claim against the assignee for sums paid to the latter under a
mistaken belief as to the propriety of the assignor's performance." In order to
reach an understanding of these aspects of the financing assignee's position, it
is necessary to supplement the property analysis with the explanation that the
assignee is an agent for collection.
B. An Assignee is a "Mere Agent for Collection"
As noted above, property analysis fails to describe adequately the effect of
an assignment of money due under a contract. It is submitted that questions
concerning the commercial triangle of the assignor, assignee, and obligor, can
70
 "External offsets" arise outside the assigned contract. In its nature, set off is an in-
dependent claim (rather than a defense to an action) which under rules of practice can be pleaded
as a defense to an action. See Stooke v. Taylor, (1880) 5 Q.B.D. 569 (per Cockburn, C J.); At-
torney Gen. for Ont. v. Russel, (1921) 64 D.L.R. 59, 49 Ont. L.R. 103 (S.C.); Campbell v. Im-
perial Bank of Can. [1924] 4 D.L.R. 289, 55 Ont. L.R. 318 (S.C.A.D); Lincoln v. Grant, 47
App. D.C. 475, 483 (1918).
7
' 3 S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 447. (Jaeger 3d ed. 1960). See also
Williston, Is the Right of an Assignee of a Chose in Action Legal or Equitable?, 30 HARV. L. REV. 97,
101-02 (1916).
72 Cook, The Alienability of Chores in Action: A Reply to Professor Williston, 30 HARV. L.
REV. 449, 473-79 (1917). But see Geva, Equities as to Liability on Bills and Notes: Rights of a Holder
Not in Due Course, 5 CAN. BUS. L.J. 53, 70-71 (1980) (queries as to both explanations).
" The point is well demonstrated in 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 2, ch. 41,
74
 An example of an entitlement to receive notices is the case of rightful rejection of
goods. Ontario Sale of Goods Act (S.G.A.), ONT. REV. STAT. 1980 c.462 s. 35; U.C.C. S
2-602(1).
" Obviously, modification of a contract for sale is relevant in the context of an assign-
ment of a contract which is executory at least in part (e.g., a contract for the sale of goods to be
delivered by stated installments).
76 See text and notes at notes 127-84 infra.
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be answered by the proposition that the assignment of money due under a con-
tract does not affect the underlying contractual relationship between the
assignor and obligor. From the obligor's viewpoint, only the notice of assign-
ment is critical. The effect of that notice, however, merely is to let the obligor
know to whom payment should be made. Questions concerning the assignee's
right to exercise remedies under the assigned contract, his obligation to abide
by modifications thereto, and his liability in restitution for payments made
under a mistake of fact, can all be answered by this mode of analysis.
This view gives new life to the original common law position as to the ef-
fect of an assignment of a chose in action, i.e., that the transaction is a mere
assignment of a right to bring an action at law against the debtor." In this
modern manifestation, however, the view does not purport to provide a com-
prehensive theory covering all aspects of the assignment of choses in action. In-
stead, the view is limited to describing the effect of an assignment on the
obligor's contractual position. Thus, insofar as the obligor is concerned, the
assignee is a "mere agent for collection," or "an attorney with a power to col-
lect or dispose of the claim for his own use." 78 While in equity and under
modern statutes a chose in action is "a piece of property"" whose transfer is
effective as against third parties, the assigned contract creates a "strictly per-
sonal" 8° relationship between the obligor and the assignor which is unaffected
by the assignment.
If an assignee is a "mere agent for collection" whose status does not affect
the obligor's contractual rights and duties, what is the basis for his independent
right to payment from the obligor? It is proposed that as an assignment is
created by a contract between the assignor and the assignee, its effect on the
obligor does not differ from the effect of any contractual relationship on third
parties. While the assignment does not affect the obligor-assignor contract, it
does charge the obligor with a duty not to interfere with the assignor-assignee
contract. Breach of this duty is actionable by the assignee in tort. 8 ' Once
notified of the assignment, the obligor is under a duty to honor it." In paying
the assignor, notwithstanding a notification of the assignment, the obligor thus
incurs tort liability towards the assignee. 83 To describe the wrongful payment
" See text and notes at notes 38-45 supra.
78 J.B. AMES, Purchase for Value Without Notice, in LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 253,
258 (1913).
79 See text and note at note 43 supra.
u° See text and note at note 40 supra. Third parties refers to competing assignees and the
assignor's creditors.
" On the tort of interference with contractual relations, see generally J. FLEMING, THE
LAW OF TORTS 676 (5th ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as FLEMING]; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS 927 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
82 He cannot settle with the assignor without the assignee's consent so as to defeat the
latter's right. See, e.g., Progressive Design Inc. v. Olson Bros. Mfg. Co., 190 Neb. 208, 206
N.W.2d 832 (1973).
83 See note 81 supra. The tortious nature of the liability is, however, not acknowledged
by modern case law. See, e.g., Manes Constr. Co. v. Wallboard Coating Co., 497 S.W.2d 334
(Tex. 1973), where on payment to the assignor notwithstanding notice of the assignment the
court speaks generally of the obligor's "double liability," without specifying its nature. Id. at
337.
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by the obligor to the assignor as a failure to discharge the obligor's debt,"
rather than as the rise of liability in tort, may describe the end result of such a
wrongful payment. It is an inaccurate description of the process leading to the
result, however, since it ignores the personal relationship created by the
assignor-obligor contract, which remains unaltered by the assignment.
The assignee's status as a "mere agent for collection" certainly could be
the basis for subjecting the claim in his hands to the obligor's defenses against
the assignor, as well as to external offsets arising prior to the assignment. The
assignee's freedom from external offsets arising after notification is consistent
with the obligor's duty not to interfere with the assignor-assignee contractual
relationship. 85 Having been notified of the assignment, the obligor may not
defeat the assignee's right emerging from the assignee's contract with the
assignor, by dealing with the assignor in connection with matters which are
unrelated to the assigned contract. Likewise, the absence of any affirmative
liability on the assignee's part for the assignor's breach of the assigned contract
follows from the fact that the assignee is a "mere agent for collection" rather
than a party to that contract owing a duty to perform it. The scope of the
assignee's agency relates to collection alone and not to the performance of the
assignor's contract.
In sum, the assignee's position towards the obligor's defenses is fully ex-
plained not only by "property" analysis, but also under the alternative "mere
agency for collection" analysis. The advantage of the latter analysis, however,
lies in its superior ability to explain the assignee's position towards the obligor
in the framework of an overall theory underlying the effect of the assignment
on the assignor-obligor's ongoing contractual relationship.
1. The Extent of the Assignee's Rights under the Assigned Contract
As an "agent for collection," the assignee is entitled to exercise all the
assignor's rights and remedies for the enforcement of the obligation under the
assigned contract." Assignment of a contract right entails the assignment of all
securities given by law 87 or by contract 88 to secure its performance. It also en-
84 Such a thought is reflected in the language of the statutory provision which governs
the assignee's right. See text and notes at notes 35-36 supra.
85
 On the nature of "external offsets," see note.70 supra.
66 For this entitlement, see Institute Cubano de Estabilizacion del Azucar v. The M V
Driller, 148 F. Supp. 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (enforceability of an arbitration clause by an
assignee); Lutz v. Dutmer, 286 Mich. 467, 282 N.W. 431 (1938) (assignment of the purchaser's
right under a land contract); Lipman v. Haeuser Shellac Co., 289 N.Y. 76, 43 N.E.2d 817
(1942); Hosiery Mfrs. Corp. v. Oldston, 238 N.Y. 22, 143 N.E, 779 (1924); In re Lowenthal,
199 App. Div. 39, 191 N.Y.S. 282 (1921), aff'd, 233 N.Y. 621, 135 N.H. 944 (1922).
" But cf. U.C.C. § 2-506(1) and 2-707(2) (referring to the seller's rights in the goods,
particularly to the right to stop delivery). The former provision is inapplicable to an ordinary
financing assignee. The application of the latter is controversial. Benfield, Rights of a Seller's
Assignee to Reclaim Goods Under the UCC, 53 TEX. L. REV. 1, 11 et seq. (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Benfield].
66 See, e.g., State Bank of De Pere v. Chicago N.W. Ry. Co., 211 Wis. 465, 248 N.W.
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tails the power to exercise rights and remedies under a security agreement
which secures the obligor's payment." The assignment confers on the assignee
the power to sue the obligor for damages for breach of his undertaking" and
not merely the power to collect the debt itself."
Nevertheless, the assignee does not step fully into the existing contractual
relationship with the obligor. He can neither rescind the contract on the
ground of the obligor's misrepresentation nor otherwise terminate the contract
in lieu of the assignor. As a "mere agent for collection" he is neither entitled to
the obligor's notices under the assigned contract, for example in the case of a
rightful rejection of goods sold under the contract, 92 nor authorized to act in
response to them. He lacks the power to accept the obligor's anticipatory
breach," as well as to instruct the obligor-buyer what to do with rightfully re-
jected goods." All matters relating to the performance or dissolution" of the
assigned contract are beyond the scope of his authority, which relates to collec-
tion alone.
Policy arguments support the assignee's exclusion from the assignor-
obligor contractual relationship. Thus, according to Professor Gilmore, "[a]s a
matter of policy . . . despite notification of assignment, the buyer should . . . be
privileged to go on dealing with the seller alone. The assignee's involvment is
with the financing aspect, not the goods aspect of the transaction."" While
423 (1933); Canadian Bank of Commerce v. Yorkshire & Can. Trust Ltd. 11939] 1 D.L.R. 401,
405 (S.C.C.).
69 See, e.g., Norton v. National Bank of Commerce of Pine Bluff, 240 Ark. 143, 398
S.W.2d 538 (1966); Wilk Enters. Inc. v. J.I.B. Realty Corp., 72 Misc.2d 507, 339 N.Y.S.2d 75
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972); Banks of Beulah v. Chase, 231 N.W.2d 738, 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 259
(N.D. 1975) (three cases of repossession by an assignee); Coin-O-Matic Serv. Co. v. Rhode
Island Hosp. Trust Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. 1112 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1966) (assignee making future
advances failed to gain priority but not because of an assignee status); Block v. Ford Motor
Credit Co., 286 A.2d 228 (App. D.C. 1972) (assignee invoked an acceleration clause; with
respect to the acceleration clause note, however, the explicit reference in U.C.C. 5 1.208 to a
party's "successor in interest"). The power of an assignee to exercise these remedies has not
been questioned.
" National Reserve Co. of Am. v. Metropolitan Trust Co. of Cal., 17 Cal.2d 827, 112
P.2d 598 (1941) (cause of action of an assignee for collection). The recoverable damage is of
course the assignor's loss. Cf. National Commercial Bank & Trust Co. v. Malik, 172 Misc.2d
865, 339 N.Y.S.2d 605 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972).
91 This was correctly noted in Jones v. Bailey, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 41, 45-46, 294 N.E.2d
599, 602 (1973). The difference between an action to collect a debt and an action for damages for
breach of contract is extensively discussed by Levontin, Debt and Contract in the Common Law, 1
ISR. L. REV. 60 (1966).
92 See provisions cited in note 74 supra.
" Regarding anticipatory breach and the innocent party's right to accept it, see W. AN-
SON, ANSON'S LAW OF CONTRACT 510 (A. Guest 24th ed. 1974).
94 The latter right is given to a seller in case of a merchant buyer under U.C.C.
2-603.
96 But cf. P.P.S.A. s. 29(1) and U.C.C. 5 9-306(5) which appear to contemplate also the
possibility of the return of the goods to the seller's assignee. Comment 4 of the Code Provision
explicitly speaks of return to the seller. U.C.C. 5 9-306(5) comment 4. Cf. Osborn v. First Nat'l.
Bank of Holdenville, 472 P.2d 440 (Okla. 1970) (assignee's objection to the return of the sold car
to the seller failed).
96 G. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 1098.
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there is only scant authority directly supporting this propostion, 97 its accuracy
is supported by the "agency for collection" analysis.
A notable exception to this absence of direct authority is the assignee's in-
ability to rescind the assigned contract on the basis of the obligor's
misrepresentation which induced the assignor to enter into the assigned con-
tract. Viewed as a personal right stemming from the misrepresentation in favor
of the misrepresentee, 98
 the bare right to rescind is not assignable." Nor does
the right pass to the financing assignee as an incident of the assignment of
rights under the contract for sale. As a post-Code case stated, "the seller's right
of reclamation'°° based on misrepresentation'°' is personal to the seller and
cannot be exercised by anyone else. " 102
 In refusing to view the assignability of
the right to rescind as an incident of the assignment of the contract; the holding
of the case is consistent with the "mere agent for collection" status of the
assignee.
2. Modification of the Assigned Contract: Its Effect on the Assignee
The rule provided under U.C.C. section 9-318(2), and followed by the
provinces of Manitoba and Saskatchewan,'" states that prior to the completion
97 Id. at	 41.6.
" See, e.g. , Collins v. Associated Greyhound Racecourses Ltd., [1930] 1 Ch. 1, 37 (per
Russell, L.J.) (undisclosed principal, not being the misrrepresentee, could not rescind the con-
tract). See also Goodhart & Hamon, Undisclosed Principals in Contract, 4 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 320,
352-53 (1932).
99 See generally 31 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND (4th ed.) Misrepresentation and
Fraud, para. 1123; Cooper v. Hillsboro Garden Tracts, 78 Or. 74, 86-88, 152 P. 488, 491-92
(1915). See also Hipp v. McMurry, 263 Ala. 11, 15, 81 So. 2d 531, 534 (1955).
1 " Under U.C.C. 5 2-702(2):
Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while insol-
vent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days after receipt,
but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular seller in
writing, within three months before delivery the ten-day limitaion does not apply.
Except as provided in this subsection the seller may not base a right to reclaim
goods on the buyer's fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of solvency or of in-
tent to pay.
Id. There is no corresponding seller's right in the Anglo-Canadian law.
i°' As an authority to the misrepresentation basis of the seller's right of reclamation, the
court cited Note, Selected Priority Problems in Secured Financing Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 68
YALE L.J. 751, 761 (1959). 458 F.2d at 941 n.4.
102 In re Hardin 458 F.2d 938, 940-41 (7th Cir. 1972). The holding of the case with regard
to the non-assignability of the seller's right to reclaim was criticized. Benfield, supra note 87, at
11-23. The critic, however, did not distinguish between the assignability of the right to damages
arising from fraud or misrepresentation, and the non-assignability of the right to rescind a contract
entered into on the basis of fraud or misrepresentation. Cf. text and notes at notes 79-80 supra
(assignability of the former as an incident of the assignment of the debt). In this respect, his
criticism is unconvincing. Other arguments made by the critic concerned the direct effect of the
misrepresentation on the assignee and the "quasi security" nature of the seller's right of
reclamation. These points are outside the present inquiry. CI text at note 311 infra.
P.P.S.A. s. 40(2). There is no corresponding provision in the Ontario P.P.S.A. But
see the recommendation to adopt it in ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION, I REPORT ON
SALE OF GOODS 125 (1979) thereinafter cited as Ontario L.R.C.
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of the assignor's performance and "notwithstanding notification of the assign-
ment, any modification of or substitution for the [assigned] contract made [by
the assignor and obligor] in good faith and in accordance with reasonable com-
mercial standards is effective against the assignee. '"° 4
 The assignee's status as
an agent of collection, combined with the tort obligations of the obligor towards
the assignee provide the only viable theory for such a rule. The original parties'
right to modify or substitute the contract as between themselves can be ex-
plained only if their ongoing contractual relationship survives the assignment,
which is the case if the assignee is a mere agent for collection. The obligor's
right to interfere with the assignor-assignee contract'" is explained in these cir-
cumstances by his privilege to protect his own contract. As a privilege to liabili-
ty for interference with contractual relations, it must be exercised in good
faith.'"
The rule under U.C.C. section 9-318(2) has never been fully acknowledged
at common law. While English common law actually rejected it altogether,
American common law fell short of conclusively endorsing it. Both the English
rejection and the American hesitation are founded on the erroneous application
of "property" analysis to the assignee-obligor relationship.
The authority for the English position holding modification after assign-
ment ineffective against the assignee is found in Brice v. Bannister."" Brice in-
volved the assignment of proceeds of a shipbuilding contract.'" Following
notification, payment was to be made by the obligor directly to the assignee. 109
The shipbuilder fell into difficulties and requested that the obligor pay him
directly."° Money so advanced to the assignor enabled him to complete the
contract."' A majority of the Court of Appeal held that an amount equal to
sums so paid could be recovered from the obligor by the assignee." 2 The ma-
jority acknowledged that the assignor's failure to perform would have excused
the obligor from paying these sums to the assignee."3 While acknowledging
that the obligor's direct payment to the assignor had avoided the latter's
failure,'" the majority reasoned that the obligor could not "defeat or prejudice
the [assignee's] right.' " 15
 A vigorous dissent was delivered by Brett, L.J., who
could not agree that the theory underlying the assignee's rights "should be ex-
The section further provides that "the assignee acquires corresponding rights under
the modified or substituted contract." See generally G. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 1121-24.
' 3 Obviously, the assignor's own power to participate in the modification of the assign-
ed contract could be in breach of his contract with the assignee. Cf. U.C.C. S 9-318(2).
"6 See generally J. FLEMING, supra note 81, at 684; W. PROSSER, supra note 81, at 944-45.
"' (1878) 3 Q.B. 569. "Apart from this decision, there appears to be no Anglo-
Canadian authority that deals squarely with the question." Ontario L.R.C., supra note 103, at
124.
108 3 Q.B. 569, 570.
109 Id. at 571.
10 Id. at 570-71.
'" Id. at 571.
" 2 Id. at 578.
'" Id. at 581.
114 Id. at 577.
16 Id. at 578 (per Cotton, L.J.).
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tended so as to prevent the parties to an unfulfilled contract from either cancel-
ling or modifying, or dealing with regard to it in the ordinary course of
business" and in good faith.'" "If they cannot modify it, it seems . . . to
denote a state of slavery in business that ought not to be suffered."" 7
American case law has not shared the dogmatism of the majority of the
court in Brice v. Bannister. 18 Indeed, direct authority supports the power of par-
ties of an assigned executory contract "to rescind or discharge [it] entirely or to
modify [it] by agreement." 9 The "right of the original parties to rescind or
modify the contract . . . in good faith" has been recognized. ' 2 °
Yet, courts are generally content with a more modest proposition,
originally pronounced in Peden Iron & Steel Co. v. McKnight: "[W]hen the ex-
istence of the assigned fund is dependent upon performance by the assignor of
an executory contract, the anticipatory debtor may . . . do whatever reasonably
appears to be necessary to enable the assignor to perform the contract." ' 2 ' The
implication of such a formulation is that the obligor's ability to modify a con-
tract is not defined by general freedom of contract principles but rather by no-
tions of what is necessary to enable the assignor to perform the contract. A
modern trend is to view this issue as a question of "priority" between the
assignee and the assignor as to sums paid to the latter in order to "rescue"
altogether the right to obtain payment from the obligor.'" The reluctance to
accept the theoretical underpinnings of section 9-318(2) can be explained as an
adherence to the notion that an assignment transfers a static property right.' 23
Instead, regarding the assignee as a "mere agent for collection" could offer a
superior viewpoint which would put the rule under U.C.C. section 9-318(2) in
line with an overall theory explaining the assignee's position towards the
obligor. As an agent for collection, the assignee cannot object to modifications
made by the original parties to the contract, as envisioned by section 9-318(2).
3. The Scope of the "Agency for Collection" Theory
It is tempting to challenge this "agency for collection" analysis by noting
its ancient origin and arguing that it is inconsistent with the modern approach
16 Id. at 579 (Brett, L.J. dissenting).
'" Id.
'" See generally G. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 55 41.8-9.
"9 Babson v. Village of Ulysses, 155 Neb. 492, 497, 52 N.W.2d 320, 324 (1952).
120 See G. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 1106-07. The original contribution of "[t]he
anonymous author of the article on assignment in Corpus Juris" in spelling out this principle is
acknowledged by Gilmore. Id., discussing material presently found at 6A C.J.S. Assignments S 85
(1975) (originally 5 C.J. 959-60).
121 60 Tex. Civ. App. 45, 50, 128 S.W. 156, 159 (1910). Note that the facts of Brice a.
Bannister, discussed in text at note 107 supra, would have fit this rule.
122 See, e.g., Walker v. Nitzberg, 13 Cal. App. 3d 359, 91 Cal. Rptr. 526 (1970); Hoover
v. Agriform Chem. Co., 268 Cal. App. 2d 818, 74 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1969).
'" An example of this notion is the view that the original parties' power of modification
is a limitation on the rule conferring on the assignee the property and the full control over the
assignee right after assignment and notice. See text and note at note 120 supra.
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to the assignment of choses in action as a transfer of pieces of property, "asset[s]
capable of being dealt with like any other asset. " 124 However, such a challenge
is based on a misconception as to the present scope of the "agency for collec-
tion" thesis, as well as on an erroneous view as to the scope of equity principles
developed to govern the assignment of choses in action. Thus, dealing with the
assignment of monies due under contracts, equity courts were concerned with
contract rights as choses in action, i.e., as pieces of property. They were not in-
terested in the effect of the assignment on the underlying contractual relation-
ship. By happenstance, the main aspect of the latter question, namely, the
assignee's subjection to the obligor's defenses, could be explained in the
framework of the general property theory developed by courts of equity. 125
This view caused the illusion that the entire effect of the assignment on the con-
tractual relationship could be explained by these principles of equity. When the
less frequently asked questions are approached, however, the theory developed
by courts of equity is inadequate. 126 The common law "agency for collection"
theory provides answers to these questions in a framework explaining the entire
effect of the assignment on the contractual relationship. As such, the common
law theory appears superior in this context to the orthodox "property" ap-
proach of courts of equity.
Nevertheless, it should be stressed that there is no conflict between the
common law "agency for collection" analysis and the equity "property"
analysis. It is not suggested here to substitute the former for the latter for all in-
tents and purposes. Each theory provides an explanation for a separate aspect
of the assignment of money due under a contract. Thus, it is possible for both
to exist simultaneously. On the one hand, equity is interested in identifying
the person who, as against the world, is entitled to the money due under a con-
tract. On the other hand, the "agency for collection" thesis is concerned with
the effect of the assignment on the contractual nexus. Inasmuch as a contract
right is a chose in action, its assignment is a transfer of property, governed by
principles of equity which were developed to deal with the effect of such a
transfer on the right to the money due. At the same time, inasmuch as the con-
tract right represents an obligatory relationship, the assignment should not af-
fect this relationship. While the assignment is a transfer of property against the
world, it merely serves as a notice to the obligor informing him to whom he
should pay. In this respect alone the assignee is a "mere agent for collection"
towards the obligor.
4. Is Money Paid to an Assignee Recoverable in Restitution?
Just as the agent for collection analysis explains the assignee's right to ex-
ercise remedies under the primary contract, as well as his obligation to abide by
124 Fitzroy v. Cave, [1905] 2 K.B. at 372. See text and notes at notes 42-45 supra.
'" See text and notes at notes 69-72 supra.
126 Such questions are summarized in text and notes at notes 73-76 supra.
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modifications thereto, so too does the analysis provide a theoretical justification
for treatment of an obligor's claim for restitution of payments made to the
assignee under a mistake of fact. As will be demonstrated, application of less
adequate explanations of the nature of the assignor-obligor relationship has
caused confusion in this area of law.
The question of restitution of payments made to the assignee"' arises
when the obligor has made payments in ignorance of the defenses which could
be asserted against the assigned claim, i.e., has paid money under a mistake of
fact. 128
 The first hurdle to be overcome is the existence of a subsisting contract;
"if the contract is not brought to an end, the payer is restricted to his remedies
under the contract which continues to govern the situation. "129
 As already ex-
plained, no remedy is available against the assignee under the assigned con-
tract.'" This hurdle is overcome when the contract is terminated."' In this
situation, could the obligor recover from a bona fide assignee?'"
Until this century, it was thought that only a mistake as to the existence of
liability could establish a right to recover money paid under a mistake of
fact.'" The following statement of Bramwell, B., in Aiken a. Short appears to
underlie this view:
In order to entitle a person to recover back money paid under a mistake of
fact, the mistake must be as to ajiza which, if true, would make the person paying
liable to pay the money, not where, if true, it would merely make it desirable
that he should pay the money.'"
The mistake, then, must be as to a fact which leads the payer to believe he is
liable for the debt.
In Aiken, the plaintiff sought to recover from the defendant a sum of
money which he had paid to her in discharge of a debt owed to the defendant
by a third party. 135
 The third party's debt was secured by an equitable mort-
gage on an asset which, subject to the mortgage, had been transferred by him
to the plantiff-payer. 136
 Payment was made by the plantiff to discharge the
'" Payments made to the assignor definitely cannot be recovered from the assignee. But
cf. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Kyle, 54 Cal. 2d 101, 351 P.2d 768, 4 Cal. Rptr. 504
(1960) (in order to enforce the contract the assignee had to cure the illegality with which it was
tainted, by restoring to the buyer "that with which the buyer parted ... including payments
which he made to the seller-assignor prior to the assignment.") Id. at 114, 351 P.2d at 776, 4 Cal.
Rptr. at 504.
lie
 There is neither an English nor a Canadian direct authority on this question. For
American authorities, see notes 139, 142, 170, and 178 infra.
129 R. GOFF & J. JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 299 (2d ed. 1978) See also id. at 26.
1" See text at notes 6-37 supra.
131
 Cf R. GOFF & J. JONES, supra note 129, at 299 (restitutionary claim for a total
failure of consideration under a contract).
'" Payee's knowledge of payor's mistake is a ground for recovery. Ward & Co. v.
Wallis [1900] 1 Q.B. 675, 678-79 (per Kennedy, J.).
133 R. GOFF & J. JONES, supra note 129 at 69.
' 34
 (1856) 1 H. & N. 210, 215, 156 Eng. Rep. 1180 (emphasis added).
'" Id. at 210-11.
136 Id.
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mortgage. The payer later discovered that the third party lacked title to the
asset and, consequently, could not convey it to the plaintiff.'" Payment had
thus not conferred on the plaintiff the desired benefit. The court held that the
plaintiff-payer could not recover the payment from the defendant-payee
because the "money which the defendant got from her debtor [through the
plaintiff] was actually due to her." 138 Because the plaintiff made the payment
under the mistaken impression that it was desirable to do so, not under the
mistaken belief that he was liable for the debt, the Aiken court refused to grant
restitution.
It remained for an 1881 Massachusetts case to apply the doctrine of Aiken
v. Short to a transaction involving the assignment of money due under a con-
tract.' 39 In Merchants' Insurance Co. u. Abbott,"° an insurer brought an action
against the assignee of an approved claim under a policy. The assignment was
made by the assured as security for the payment of a debt owed by him to the
assignee. Having paid the assignee, the insurer discovered that the assured had
deceived him as to his entitlement. Consequently, the insurer-obligor sought to
recover the assured's creditor, namely from the assignee, an amount equal to
sums paid to him under the policy. 141 The Merchants court, however, held the
obligor was not entitled to restitution.'"
The basis of the Merchants court's decision to deny the obligor restitution of
his payments to the assignee does not appear to lie in the Aiken decision,
however. The cases are quite dissimilar in certain respects. While Aiken
presented no mistake as to the validity of the underlying debt discharged,'" the
Merchants case did involve a mistake as to the ability to avoid liability. In an
obligor-assignee situation, the obligor's defenses under the assigned debt affect
his liability thereunder. Referring to the distinction drawn by the Aiken court,
Merchants did not involve a mistake as to a fact which, "if true, would merely
make it desirable to pay." 144 Instead, the mistake in Merchants was "as to a fact
which, if true, would make the person paying liable to pay the money. ,,145
While one could draw a distinction between a mistake as to facts which nullify a
"7 Id.
13B
	 at 215 (per Platt, B.).
134 Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Abbot, 131 Mass. 397, 402 (1881).
' 4° Id. at 397.
' 4 ' Id. at 397-98.
142 Id. at 402. Other old authorities in this direction are cited by j. B. Ames, The Doctrine
of Price v. Neal, in LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 270, 273 (1913). See also Annot., 114 A.L.R.
382, 384 (1938). Modern authorities include Federated Mut. Ins. Co, v. Good Samaritan Hosp.
191 Neb. 212, 214 N.W.2d 493 (1974); Crompton-Richmond Co. v. Raylon Fabrics, Inc., 33
A.D.2d 741, 305 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1969); McMullen Leavens Co. v. L.I. Van Buskirk Co., 275
A.D. 701, 87 N.Y.S.2d 355, affd, 299 N.Y. 784, 87 N.E.2d 682 (1949); First State Bank of Or.
v. Peoples Nat'l Bank of Wash., 254 Or. 309, 359 P.2d 984 (1969); and Daniels v. Parker, 209
Or. 419, 306 P.2d 735 (1957).
144 See Merchants, 131 Mass. at 403.
144 Aiken v. Short, (1856) 1 H. & N. 210, 215, 156 Eng. Rep. 1180.
143 Id.
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subsisting liability, as in Merchants, and a mistake as to the existence of the debt
itself,'" the Aiken paradigm, the differences between the two situations are
more of form than substance. Defenders of the result in Merchants, therefore,
must look elsewhere than Aiken for support.
Aiken no longer represents the only source of law to which advocates of the
Merchants result may look; however, present authorities appear to repudiate the
view of Aiken that recovery of money paid under a mistake of fact will only be
allowed if the mistake is one as to liability. Under the modern view, it is suffi-
cient that the mistake would be "in some respect or another fundamental to the
transaction, "14 7 As this is a broad all-inclusive test, the question becomes
whether the obligor-assignee situation falls within a recognized exception to the
rule.'" Accordingly, the Merchants decision must be re-examined to determine
if there exists a sound theoretical basis for the opinion in the modern law of
restitution.
A close reading of Merchants reveals that while relying on Aiken, the case
was not decided according to whether the obligor's mistake concerned the ex-
istence of liability.'" Instead, the grounds for the denial of restitution were: (a)
that the obligor's mistake was not "as between" himself and the assignee, but
rather "as between" himself and the assignor; (b) that the obligor's payment
to the assignee was made at the assignor's request and on his behalf so as to be
"in legal effect a payment by the [obligor] to [the assignor];" and (c) that pay-
ment by the obligor to the assignee at the assignor's request was "a satisfaction
of [the assignor's] debt to [the assignee]: 18 °
Statements requiring an operative mistake of fact to be "as between"
plaintiff and defendant have recently been characterized as "dogmatic denials
of the plaintiff's right to recover in restitution" which cannot be upheld.' 5 1 "In
principle recovery should be allowed because it is the payer's mistake which
alone should be relevant."'" The modern law of restitution, then, seems to
repudiate the first ground of the Merchants decision.
The second ground for the Merchants opinion was the theory that the
obligor's payment to the assignee was in legal effect a payment to the obligor to
the assignor. Accordingly, no action of restitution could be pursued against the
assignee, which as a matter of law, was not the recipient of the payment. This
rationale could have merit in the situation where a creditor instructs his debtor
to pay a third party without conferring on that third party any rights of his own
1+6 Recovery under the latter kind of mistake was allowed in Norwich Union Fire Ins.
Soc'y Ltd. v. Wm. H. Price, Ltd., [1934] A.C. 455.
'" Morgan v. Ashcroft, 11938] 1 K.B. 49, 77 (per Scott L. J.) (emphasis added); R.
GOFF & J. JONES, supra note 129, at 69-71.
148 Cf. the approach of Goff, J., in Barclays Bank Ltd. v. W. J. Simms Son & Cooke (S.)
Ltd., [1980] 2 W.L.R. 218, 232 (Q.B.D.).
149 Aiken v. Short itself is frequently explained on a broader ground, R. GOFF &I JONES,
supra note 129, at 85-88. Cf. text and notes at notes 159-63 infra (the defense of bona fide pur-
chase).
15° Merchants, 131 Mass. at 401.
"' R. GOFF & J. JONES, supra note 129, at 74.
"2 Id.
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to pursue against the debtor.'" Yet, inasmuch as the right to enforce payment
belongs to the assignee, payment in its satisfaction could not be regarded as
payment to the assignor. In other words, the second ground fails to meet the
objection raised by the assignee's "property" in the right to obtain payment
from the debtor.'"
The third ground relied upon by the Merchants court to deny restitution to
the obligor was that the obligor's payment was in satisfaction of the assignor's
debt to the assignee. Under this view, the payment is in satisfaction of a valid
debt and therefore not recoverable in restitution. One flaw inherent in this ra-
tionale is that it excludes situations where there is no outstanding indebtedness
between the assignor and his assignee, as is the case in an outright sale of
receivables without recourse.' 55 Apart from that consideration, the conceptual
framework of the rationale is also unsound. Payment by the obligor to the
assignee is in satisfaction of the obligor's own debt. An additional effect of the
payment could well be the discharge of the assignor's debt to the assignee.
However, it is erroneous to conclude that the obligor's payment is made in
satisfaction of the assignor's indebtedness. In fact, here lies the fundamental
difference between Aiken and Merchants. Payment in the former was indeed in
satisfaction of the third party's debt to the defendant-payee. 156 The plaintiff-
payer's mistake did not concern the discharged indebtedness and thus could
not be "in some respect or another fundamental to the transaction [underlying
it]." 157 In Merchants, however, the payer's payment was in satisfaction of his
own debt and his mistake concerned the transaction giving rise to the debt.'"
The mistake, therefore, does appear to be fundamental to the transaction.
Just as the Aiken decision failed to constitute compelling precedent for the
holding that the obligor may not collect restitution of payments made to the
assignee, so too does the "fundamental to the transaction" test fail to support
the three grounds of the Merchants decision. The search for a theoretical
justification for the decision thus continues. A few eminent jurists from both
sides of the Atlantic regard the obligor's inability to raise his restitutionary
claim against the assignee as an aspect of the defense of bona fide purchase. 159
This view is shared by the editors of the American Restatement of Restitution. 160
'" Indeed the case of a buyer who instructs a seller to deliver the goods to a subbuyer,
Merchants, 131 Mass. at 402, falls within this category.
154 Cf. text at notes 77-126 supra.
'" Of. R. GOFF & J. JONES, supra note 129, at 86 n.24.
16 See text and notes at notes 134-38 supra. Payment could thus be regarded as payment
by the third party through an agent.
167 See text and note at note 147 supra.
138 See text and note at note 141 supra.
169 R. GOFF & J. JONES, supra note 129, at 85; 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 1574
(3rd ed. 1970). See also Ames, supra note 142, at 272, speaking of the "far-reaching principle of
natural justice [under which] as between two persons having equal equities, one of whom must
suffer, the legal title shall prevail." According to Ames, this principle explains, inter alio, the
assignee's right to "keep what he has got, although the obligor paid in ignorance of the fact that
he had a valid defense to the enforcement of the claim." Id. at 277-78.
' 6° See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 14(2) (1937). "An assignee of a non-
negotiable chose in action who, having paid value therefor, has received payment from the
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However, the doctrine of good faith purchase does not apply to an assignee of a
chose in action."' This view, therefore, must be taken as a theoretical
framework both for ground (c) in Merchants' 62 and for Aiken 63 Alternatively, it
is a species of the "as between" limitation on restitutionary recovery.'" Either
way, with the failure of ground (c) and the "as between" limitation, the bona
fide purchase view is not convincing.
It has been stated recently that a restitutionary claim may fail if "payment
is made for good consideration, in particular if the money is paid to discharge,
and does discharge, a debt owed to the payee . . . by the payer. " 65 This broad
language appears to apply to a payer who forgoes his defenses and obtains
through his payment a discharge for an otherwise valid liability.'" Yet, it is
submitted that in its true sense, the phrase should be limited to payment made
either "with a full knowledge of the facts' " 67 or "without reference to the truth
or falsehood of the fact. '" 68 Indeed, a discharge of an obligation which has
been extinguished by virtue of valid defenses could hardly be regarded as
"good consideration" unless a compromise is involved. By its nature, a com-
promise contemplates "waiving further investigation and taking the risk of
[mistake]. " 69 Absent this assumption of risk, payment of a liability to which
there exists a valid defense cannot be regarded as having been made for valid
consideration.
There is great difficulty, then, in posting a theoretical justification for de-
nying the obligor's restitutionary claim against the assignee. The holding in
Merchants is not compelled by Aiken, nor by the "fundamental to the transac-
tion" test of the modern law of restitution. Similarly, notions of the assignee as
a good faith purchaser, and the concept of the obligor's payments being made
for valid consideration, both fail to justify denial of the obligor's claim.
The theoretical weakness underlying the objection to the obligor's restitu-
tionary claim against the assignee undoubtedly has contributed to the recent
erosion of support for this objection by American courts. The Supreme Court
of Ohio signaled this turning point in Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. General Na-
obligor is under no duty to make restitution although the obligor has had a defense thereto, if the
transferee made no misrepresentation and did not have notice of the defense." The comment is
explicit in viewing the provision as "a specific application of the underlying principle of bona fide
purchase." Id. comment a. See also W. A. SEAVEY & A.W. Scorr, NOTES OF RESTATEMENT OF
RESTITUTION 9 (1937).
"' See, e.g., Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057,
1067-68 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Gilmore, Commercial Doctrine]. Notwithstanding Williston ON
CONTRACTS, supra note 159, the good faith purchase of the money is not to the point.
162 See text at note 150 supra.
' 63 See citations from R. GOFF & J. JONES supra note 129, at 85, and the American
Restatement, W.A. SEAVEY & A.W. SCOTT', supra note 160, at 9.
164 See text and notes at notes 151, 156-58 supra.
163 Barclays Bank v. Simms Son & Cooke, [1980] 2 W.L.R. at 232.
166 See, e.g., W.A. SEAVEY & A.W. SCOTT, supra note 160, at 9.
' 67 Brisbane v. Dacres, (1813) 5 Taunt. 143, 152, 128 Eng. Rep. 641 (per Gibbs, J.).
169
 Kelly v. Solari, (1841) 9 M. & W. 54, 59, 152 Eng. Rep. 24 (per Parke, B.); R, GOFF
& J. JONES, supra note 129, at 30 (emphasis added). See also text and notes at notes 95.97 supra.
'69 R. GOFF & J. JONES, supra note 129, at 30 (emphasis added). See text and notes at
notes 95-97 supra.
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tional Bank of Cleveland. 17° Firestone involved a buyer's action against his seller's
assignee to recover sums paid to the assignee under the mistaken belief that the
sums were due on accounts assigned by the seller as security for a loan."' In
fact, the sums were not due as the goods had not been sent by the seller. 12 The
court held that sums paid by the buyer and credited against the loan were
recoverable.'" The court failed to give any consideration to the fact that the
payee was the seller's financing assignee. " 4 Moreover, under the facts of the
case, the court charged the defendant-assignee with "an implied representa-
tion that [the seller] had delivered goods in transit to [the buyer]."'" This
representation "induced [the buyer] to make the payment." 16 Considering
the representation aspects of the case, the decision appears to fall short of
establishing a broad basis for a restitutionary claim against the assignee in the
hands of an obligor.
Unfortunately, these limitations of the Firestone decision were overlooked
by Professor Gilmore who concluded on the basis of the case that "where the
assignor fails to perform the contract, the assignee cannot retain mistaken or
even negligent payments made to it by the obligor unless there has been a
subsequent change of position by the assignee.'"" Backed with Gilmore's sup-
port, this interpretation of Firestone gained a foothold in subsequent case law. 18
Adherence to Gilmore's interpretation has been strict. Courts following
Gilmore's interpretation even disregard his failure to question whether the
seller-assignor's subsequent insolvency, leaving the assignee without a mean-
ingful recourse against him, constitutes "a subsequent change of position by
the assignee" so as to deny recovery within Gilmore's own contemplation.'"
No convincing theory supporting the obligor's restitutionary claim against the
assignee appears to emerge from recent case law. It is submitted that such sup-
port does not exist, and that the restitutionary claim's emergence can be at-
tributed to the confusion underlying Merchants. A misunderstanding as to the
assignee-obligor relationship is the essence of this confusion. As in the areas of
the assignee's rights under the assigned contract, and his obligation to abide by
modifications thereto, the concept of the assignee as an agent for collection pro-
vides a helpful mode of analysis.
Under the agent for collection analysis, the assignment of the benefit of a
contract neither charges the obligor with disabilities nor confers upon him ad-
ditional rights. From the obligor's point of view, the assignee is a "mere agent
' 7° 159 Ohio St. 423, 112 N.E.2d 636 (1953).
' 7 ' Id. at 424-28, 112 N.E.2d at 638-39.
"2 Id. at 428, 441, 112 N.E.2d at 640, 645. Query whether this finding is compatible
with the court's view that the lender was a holder in due course with respect to a check given
directly to the seller and then negotiated to him.
' 73 Id. at 441, 112 N.E.2d at 645.
14 See Id. at 439-42, 112 N.E.2d at 644-46.
'" Id. at 440, 112 N.E.2d at 645.
"° Id.
' 77 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 1096-97 n.4.
18 Farmers Acceptance Corp. v. DeLozier, 178 Colo. 291, 496 P.2d 1016 (1972). Cf.
Benton State Bank v. Warren 263 Ark. 1, 562 S.W.2d 74 (1978).
19 See text and notes at note 177 supra.
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for collection" to the account of the assignor. The assignee's independent right
is relevant only in his relations with third parties, such as creditors of or pur-
chasers from the seller-assignor, but not against the obligor.'" This is in fact an
explanation of the second ground given by the court in Merchants: a payment to
the assignee is "in legal effect a payment by the [obligor] to [the assignor]: " 81
Yet, as the court failed to pronounce this ground in a framework of a com-
prehensive theory of agency which explains the assignee-obligor relationship,
the ground sounded unpersuasive. 182
On final account, what underlies the denial of the obligor's restitutionary
claim against the assignee, is the analogy between the assignee's position and
that of an agent for collection applying payment towards his principal's in-
debtedness to him. Indeed, the general rule is that an agent who has received
payment on his principal's behalf is subject to the payer's restitutionary claim
for money paid under mistake.'" Nonetheless, an exception exists where the
agent has applied the payment towards his principal's indebtedness to him. 184
Except in an outright sale of receivables without recourse, the assignee, as an
agent for collection, falls directly within this exception. It is submitted that the
position of an assignee in a non-recourse outright sale is sufficiently analogous
to the position of assignees in other situations so as to be governed by the same
rule. While in a non-recourse outright sale there is no assignor's outstanding
indebtedness to the assignee, the assignee does apply the obligor's payment
towards the expenses he had incurred in purchasing the receivables. This
perspective should put him on the same footing as an assignee applying pay-
ment towards the assignor's indebtedness.
The agent for collection analysis, then, provides a rationale for the denial
of the obligor's restitutionary claim against the assignee. While the conceptual
failings of other proferred rationales resulted in the erosion of the rule in Mer-
chants, the agency analysis places the decision on firm footing. In turn, this
serves to implement sound policies. Thus, by denying the obligor's restitu-
tionary claim against the assignee, the agent for collection analysis leads to a
result which prevents the circumvention of the rule under which the financing
assignee is not liable for the assignor's breach of the assigned contract.'" As in-
dicated elsewhere by this author, a rule which provides for the lack of an affir-
mative liability on the part of the financing assignee, is consistent with opti-
mality considerations.' 86
 Supporting such a rule, the agency for collection
theory serves a useful purpose.
' 8° Cf. text and notes at notes 78-84 supra.
18 ' 131 Mass. at 401. See text and note at note 150, supr a.
"2 See text and notes at notes 153-54, supra.
"3 See generally R. GOFF & J. JONES, note 129, at 556-59.
184
 Holland v. Russel, (1861) 1 B. & S. 424, 121 Eng. Re 773; R. GOFF & J. JONES,
note 129, at 557-58.
"5
 For this rule see text at notes 60-68, supra.
186 Geva, Optimality and Preservation of Consumer Defenses—A Model for Reform, 31 CASE W.
L. REV.
supra
RES. 51, 70-73 (1980).
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III. THE FINANCING ASSIGNEE AND THE OBLIGOR'S DEFENSES:
CUT-OFF DEVICES AND THE EFFECT OF CONSUMER PROTECTION LEGISLATION
A. The Effectiveness of Cut-off Devices
It is in a financer's self-interest to take the receivables of an assignor free
from the obligor's defenses. His best course would be to abandon receivables
financing altogether and lend money directly to retail buyers to enable them to
buy on cash. As a borrower, the obligor would be absolutely liable to repay the
loan whether or not he was satisfied with the goods purchased with the bor-
rowed funds. 187 However, receivables financing gives the assignee the
assurance of a regular flow of business from sellers of goods, as well as an easy
means of securing a seller's liability as an indorser of the retail paper. 188 In ad
dition, receivables financing in the United States historically was not subject to
state usury laws.'" It also gave the financer an advantageous position on the
debtor's default, as well as an exemption from filing statutes.'" The existence
of these advantages prompted the financer to develop a means of protecting his
self-interest without undermining the use of receivables financing.
To achieve this goal, financers adopted devices such as the promissory
note and the waiver of defense, or cut-off clause in the conditional sale con-
tract."' The promissory note is "an unconditional promise . . . to pay . . . a
sum certain in money. . . "192 It is a "negotiable instrument" used to insulate
the financer from the obligor's defenses on the basis of the old law merchant' 83
as incorporated into modern statutes."' The cut-off clause is an agreement by
the buyer, contained in the sale contract, not to assert against an assignee any
defenses which he may have against the seller. The effectiveness of such a
clause stems from the power of parties, by their own agreement, to make their
1 " Obviously this is not always true any more. Provisions governing the preservation of
consumer defenses against some lenders are included in the regulation and the statute respective-
ly cited in notes 286 and 290, infra.
188 Cf. Hogan, Integrating the UCCC and the UCC—Limitations on Creditors' Agreements and
Practices, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 686, 690 (1968). As to the seller's liability as an indorser,
cf discussion on recourse and without recourse arrangement in text and notes at notes 21-31
supra.
189 See generally Gilmore, Commercial Doctrine, supra note 161.
'so Id.
19 ' See generally Comment, Consumer Protection—The Role of Cut-Off Devices in Consumer
Financing, [1968] Wts. L. REV. 505.
192 See definitions in s. 176(1) of the Canadian Bills of Exchange Act, CAN. REV. STAT.
1970, C. B
- 5 (as amended) [hereinafter cited as the Canadian B.E.A.]; I of the American
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (N.I.L.); and 5 3-104 of the American Uniform Commer-
cial Code (U.C.C.) Article 3 of the U.C.C. replaced the N.I.L. in all American jurisdictions.
1 " Brown v. Davies, (1789) 3 T.R. 80, 100 Eng. Rep. 466, is cited by Britton as an ear-
ly case where a holder of an instrument overcame a prior party's defense. Earlier cases recog-
nized the holder's power to cut off antecedent legal titles. Anon., (1698) 1 Salk 126, 91 Eng. Rep.
118, Miller v. Race, (1758) 1 Burr. 452, 97 Eng. Rep, 398. See generally the historical note in W.
BRITTON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES 244 (2d ed. 1961).
194 See sources cited in note 192 supra.
690	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:665
contract "assignable free from and unaffected by . . . equities [existing be-
tween them]. '" 96
To take a promissory note free from the obligor's defenses, the financer
must be a bona fide purchaser for value, or in the technical language of
statutes, a "holder in due course.'" 96
 Likewise, regardless of their language,
waiver of defense clauses are deemed to incorporate a "good faith" require-
ment. Thus, both devices, the promissory note and the wavier of defense
clause, can benefit only an assignee who has acquired his rights in good faith.
"Good faith" means honesty and is determined subjectively. In relation to the
financing assignee, "good faith" is the absence of both actual knowledge of the
obligor's defenses and the means of attaining such knowledge to which the
assignee willfully shuts his eyes. Neither mere suspicion of the existence of
defenses, nor mere knowledge of the terms of the contract which are capable of
giving rise to defenses, defeats the assignee's good faith.'" Indeed, "notice of a
condition to liability on an instrument, as distinguished from notice of an executory
consideration, prevents one from [becoming] a holder in due course. "198
However, the "condition" whose knowledge prevents one from enjoying a
holder in due course status is one which triggers liablity on an instrument. For
example, one who knows that an instrument was given as collateral to secure a
principal obligation' 99 knows in effect that liability on the instrument arises on-
ly on the breach of the principal obligation. He thus has notice of a condi-
tion—breach of the principal obligation—which triggers liability on the instru-
ment and therefore he may not enjoy a holder in due course status. He may not
enforce the instrument against the obligor unless the condition (breach of the
195 In re The Agra & Masterman's Bank Ltd., ex parte The Asiatic Banking Corp. Ltd.,
(1867) L.R. 2 Ch. App. 391, 397, 36 L.J. Ch. 222, 226 (per Cairns, L.J.). It would not matter
whether in enforcing a waiver of defense clause an assignee acts as a direct promisee from the
obligor (who gave consideration thereto by taking the assignment on the basis of the clause) or as
an assignee of the right arising from the clause (originally running to the assignor though in the
assignee's favor). In either case, the enforcing assignee is neither a mere third party beneficiary
of the promise in the clause, nor a "mere agent for collection" of the assignor's debt (cf. text and
notes at notes 38-184, supra). But cf. Hamilton v. Railton [1925] 3 D.L.R. 1090 (Sask. CA)
(unless he is a direct promisee, an assignee is subject to the obligor's power to rescind the
assigned contract, notwithstanding the waiver of defense clause).
196 See ss. 56(1) and 74(b) of the Canadian B.E.A.; SS 52 and 57 of the N.I.L., and §5
3-302(1) and 3-305 of the U.C.C.
197 See generally, W. BRrr-roN, supra note 193, at 245-46, 271-72, 279-83; A. ROGERS,
FALCONBRIDGE ON BANKING AND BILLS OF EXCHANGE 442-43, 628-32 (7th ed. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as FALCONBRIDGE]. "Good faith" is defined in terms of "honesty" in s. 3 of
the Canadian B.E.A. and U.C.C. S 1-201(19).
Statutes treat the element of "without notice" as separate from the element of "good
faith"; see sections cited in note 196, supra. Yet, substantively, the former is part of the latter.
199 Cooke v. Real Estate Trust Co., 180 Md. 133, 143, 22 A.2d 554, 560 (1941) (em-
phasis added). See also First & Lumbermen's Nat'l Bank v. Bucholz 220 Minn. 97, 18 N.W.2d
771 (1945). "It is well settled that knowledge of an executory consideration, as distinguished
from knowledge of a condition to liability on a negotiable instrument . . . does not prevent one
from taking it as a holder in due course," Id. at 101, 18 N.W.2d at 774.
199 For such an instrument see, e.g., Holmes v. Kidd, (1858) 3 H & N 891, 157 Eng.
Rep. 729.
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principal obligation) has been fulfilled. On the other hand, knowledge of a
"condition" which under the terms of an executory contract excuses liability
on the instrument given in payment under that contract does not prevent one
from becoming a holder in due course. For example, the seller's failure to
deliver the goods to the buyer is typically a condition which under the sale
agreement excuses the buyer from his duty to pay for the goods. Knowledge of
the actual occurrence of such a failure is knowledge of the buyer's defenses. Yet
knowledge of this "condition" merely as a term of the contract is not
knowledge of a "condition to liability," but rather of an "executory considera-
tion." As such, it should not defeat the assignee's good faith.'"
The use of the waiver of defense clause in the United States was prompted
at the turn of this century by doubts as to the negotiability 2 °' of a promissory
note used with a conditional sale contract.'" Insofar as these doubts stemmed
from interpreting the "unconditional promise" on the note as being qualified
by the obligation on the conditional sale contract and, thus, dependent on the
seller's satisfactory performance thereunder, they were unconvincing. The
"unconditional promise" on a promissory note is a formal requirement which
has nothing to do with the actual agreement of the promissor. 203 A separate
promissory note, given in conjunction with an obligation on a conditional sale
contract, retains its individual identity and, therefore, is negotiable. None-
theless, insofar as the doubts as to negotiability stemmed from the practice of
printing a promissory note and a conditional sale contract on the same sheet of
paper, they were quite substantial. While by itself the promise to pay satisfied
the formal requirements of a promissory note, typically it was followed by a
recital of the other terms of agreement. This fact invited the argument that the
promise to pay was not "unconditional" and hence the document containing it
was not a "promissory note" 204
 capable of being transferred free from the
obligor's defenses. The argument succeeded in a few jurisdictions. 205
At the same time, financers were reluctant to abandon this "single sheet"
or "integrated chattel paper" concept. 206 Its use gave them the assurance that
a mistaken or fraudulent seller would not assign the conditional sale contract to
200 This would be so notwithstanding First & Lumbermen's Nat'l Bank v. Bucholz, 220
Minn. 97, 18 N.W.2d 771 (1945) (see also Annot., 44 A. L.R.2d 8, 130 (1955)) where the court
viewed knowledge by the assignee bank of the seller's executory obligation to deliver the goods as
"notice of a condition to liability" which prevented it from becoming a holder in due course.
201 The various meanings of "negotiable" and "negotiability" are set forth in Gilmore,
Commercial Doctrine, supra note 161, at 1063-67. The definition includes the quality of transferabili-
ty free from the obligor's defenses.
202 See generally id. at 1094. The controversy persisted for quite a long period; see cases
collected in Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 8 (1955).
203
 Cf. Aigler, Conditions in Bills and Notes, 26 MICH L. REV. 471, 480 (1928).
20' See Comment, Is the Negotiability of a Promissory Note Impaired by a Retention of Tide
Clause?, 7 TUL L. REV. 607 (1933).
205
	 Gilmore, Commercial Doctrine, supra note 161, at 1094.
2° 6 For these terms, see Ziegel, Range a. Corporation de Finance Belvedere, 48 CAR. B. REV.
309, 310 (1970).
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anyone but the holder of the promissory note. 207 Perhaps financers also hoped
that the use of an integrated document could prompt courts to extend the "im-
parting negotiability" doctrine to a conditional sales contract travelling with a
negotiable note. Under this doctrine, "universally accepted in the mortgage
cases, '20E1
a negotiable note `imparts' its negotiability to the mortgage which secures
it, so that both note and mortgage pass free of equities and defenses; the
holder in due course of the note can foreclose his mortgage without being
subject to the mortgagor's defenses in the same way that he can collect his
money claim by suing on the note."'
For unexplained reasons the doctrine had not been applied to the conditional
sale contract."° Perhaps financers hoped that an integrated document would
alter the courts' position. To be on the safe side, by inserting the waiver of
defense clause into the integrated document, financers sought to avoid the risk
of subjecting themselves to the buyer's defenses if the note were to be held non-
negotiable. Use of an effective waiver of defense clause thus enabled financers
to protect their interests and devise "a scheme of operations that could be car-
ried out nationally with as few local variations as possible. "211
Nonetheless, the waiver of defense clause did not receive a uniformly
warm reception by courts in the United States. In American National Bank v.
Sommerville, 212 the California Supreme Court invalidated the clause on the
theory that such an effort to deprive an obligor of his contract defenses at-
tempted to create a negotiable instrument outside the framework of the
Negotiable Instruments Law (N.I.L.). While the N.I.L. appeared to disfavor
the achievement of negotiability by contract, 213 Professor Gilmore accurately
criticized this aspect of the Sommerville decision. 214 Although precluding the
obligor from asserting his defenses against the assignee, the contract containing
a waiver of defense clause remained otherwise non-negotiable and, thus, did
not interfere with the policy of "no negotiability by contract." Indeed, "if
without notice of assignment the buyer paid the assignor, he would be
207 In case of the note ending up with persons different from those party to the condi-
tional sale agreement, it is the holder in due course of the note who prevails over the assignee of
the conditional sale contract. Until dishonor of the note the obligation on the sale has been
suspended. Kessler, Levi & Ferguson, Some Aspects of Payment by Negotiable Instrument: A Comparative
Study, 45 YALE L. J. 1373 (1936). See also U.C.C. $ 3-802(1)(b).
208 Gilmore, Commercial Doctrine, supra note 161, at 1094.
"9 Id. at 1083. For the scope of the doctrine and for its impact on the holder in due
course's position vis-a-vis the mortgagee or the mortgagor's transferees and creditors, see, e.g.,
Bautista & Kennedy, The Imputed Negotiability of Security Interests Under the Code, 38 IND. L.J. 574
(1963); Britton, Assignment of Mortgages Securing Negotiable Notes, 10 ILL. L. REV. 337 (1916).
210 See Gilmore, Commercial Doctrine, supra note 161 at 1094.
211 Id. at 1095.
212 191 Cal. 364, 216 P. 376 (1923).
213 See N.I.L. 1: "An instrument to be negotiable must conform to the following re-
quirement ." (emphasis added). Arguably this language (with no counterpart either in the
Canadian B.E.A. or the U.C.C.) bars the creation of "negotiable instruments" which do not
comply with the requirement of the N.I.L.
214 Gilmore, Commercial Doctrine, supra note 161, at 1095.
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discharged; if the seller assigned the same contract successively to A and to B,
their priorities would be determined by the common law of assignment and not
by the law of negotiable instruments. " 2 "
In Anglo-Calfornia Trust Co. v. Ha11, 216 the Utah Supreme Court upheld the
waiver of defense clause where the buyer's defense was breach of warranty and
no fraud was involved. 2 " The court cited "public policy," however, as a basis
for limiting the clause's effectiveness to such a situation. 218 This public policy-
oriented limitation was not universally accepted. For example, it was argued
that the waiver of defense clause "does not exempt the wrongdoer himself from
an action by the defrauded [buyer]." 218 Rather, it is . . . a device for the pro-
tection of an innocent person in the form of a direct promise to him." 220 Not-
withstanding this argument, by 1940 the majority view in the United States
adhered to this "breach of warranty in the absence of fraud" rule."' Within its
framework an assignee could rely successfully on a waiver of defense clause.
The Uniform Commercial Code removed all doctrinal doubts as to the ef-
fectiveness of cut-off devices in the United States. Under section 9-206(1), "an
agreement by a buyer . . . that he will not assert against an assignee any claim
or defense which he may have against the seller . . . is enforceable by an
assignee who takes his assignment for value, in good faith and without notice of
a claim or defense." 222 The section also provides that "a buyer who as part of
one transaction signs both a negotiable instrument and a security agreement
makes such an agreement." 223 In addition, Article 3 provides that "[a]
separate agreement does not affect the negotiability of an instrument. "224 T o
the language of the official comment, "[t]he negotiability of an instrument is
always to be determined by what appears on the face of the instrument
alone. "225
The practice of printing the promissory note and the conditional sale con-
tract on the same piece of paper spread to Canada. As in the United States,'"
this inevitably gave rise to the issue of the negotiability of the "promissory
note." Draftsmen countered this difficulty in two ways. First, they separated
215 Id.
216 61 Utah 223, 211 P. 991 (1922).
217
	 at 229, 211 P. at 993-94.
218
	 211 P. at 994.
2"
 Beutel, Negotiability by Contract: A Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 28 ILL. L. REV.
205, 214 (1933).
220 Id.
221 Gilmore, Commercial Doctrine, supra note 161, at 1096 n.118. The minority view
adhered to Sommerville. Id.
222 U.C.C. 9-206(1). The provision adds that this assignee is nonetheless subject to
defenses "which may be asserted against a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument." Id.
This fact has never been in doubt (cf, American Plan Corp. v. Woods, 16 Ohio App. 2d 1, 240
N.E.2d 886 (1968)). The "buyer of consumer goods" exception of 5 9-206(1) is mentioned in the
text and notes at notes 233-34 infra.
223 U.C.C. 5 9-206(1).
224 U.C.C. 5 3-119(2).
225 U.C.C. 5 3-119 comment 5.
226
 See text and note at note 204 supra.
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the "promissory note" from the rest of the conditional sale contract, although
retaining them on the same sheet of paper. 227 Second, they also inserted a
waiver of defense clause in the terms of the conditional sale contract itself. 228
The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the effectiveness of this scheme in
Killoran v. Monticello State Bank. 229 Three justices based their decision on the in-
dependence of the promissory note in relation to the contract: "the collateral
agreement is no part of the instrument . . [;] it is not to qualify the absolute
obligation of the promissor. " 23° Though printed on the same piece of paper as
the contract, the promissory note was found to be "severable from this agree-
ment." 231
 The two other justices relied on the waiver of defense clause. 2 S 2 The
case thus resulted in an unqualified victory for the cut-off devices. No one
device, however, received unanimous approval from the court.
B. The Courts' Challenge to the Cut-off Devices
Nonetheless, the doctrinal victory of the cut-off devices came too late and
gave financers too little. When used in connection with the sale of consumer
goods, the enforceability of these devices had been questioned in the United
States on public policy grounds since the early forties. Concerns over the use of
the devices in consumer transactions were based on two considerations: the in-
ferior bargaining position of individual consumers vis-a-vis the commercial
community, and the existence of a regular course of business between financers
and sellers of consumer goods. 233 Recognition of these factors led to an increas-
ing awareness that "the buyer—Mr. and Mrs. General Public—should have
some protection somewhere along the line." 234
The draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial Code purported to stay
neutral. Thus, the rule as to the effectiveness of the cut-off devices was explicit-
227 See generally Ziegel, supra note 206, at 310. Canadian cases dealing with the
negotiability of the integrated document are collected by Falconbridge [1927] 1 D.L.R. 1. Ste also
Read, Negotiability as It Affects Lien Notes, 5 CAN. B. REV. 314 (1927).
220 Id.
229 61 S.C.R. 528 (1921). This holding was followed in Union Acceptance Corp. Ltd. v.
St. Armour, 8 D.L.R.2d 2 (Ont. CA 1957) and Prudential Fin. Corp. Ltd. v. Kucheran, 45
D.L.R.2d 402 (Ont. CA 1964).
230 61 S.C.R. 528, 531 (per Duff, J.).
231 Id. at 534 (per Mignault, J.). The third justice relying on the independence of the
promissory note was ldington, J.
232
	 and Brodeur, J.J. Note, however, that Duff, J., linked the independence of
the promise on the note to the waiver of defense clause: "By its express terms [the collateral
agreement] is not to qualify the absolute obligation of the promissor . ." Id. at 531. Note fur-
ther that Mignault, J., "also concur[red] in the reasons for judgment of . . Anglin . . ." Id.
at 534.
233
 For discussion of this topic, see Gilmore, Commercial Doctrine, supra note 161, at 1097
et seq., and Shuchman, Consumer Credit by Adension Contracts II, 35 TEMP. L.Q. 281 (1962).
234 Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649, 653 (Fla. 1953). The buyer in this case
(maker of the promissory note) was a small businessman. For a review of decisions and statutes
see Navin, Waiver of Defense Clauses in Consumer Contracts, 48 N.C.L. REV. 505 (1970).
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ly stated to be "[s]ubject to any statute or decision which establishes a different
rule for buyers . . of consumer goods. " 235 The official comment clarified this
by stating that Article 9 of the Code "takes no position on the controversial
question whether a buyer of consumer goods may effectively waive defenses by
contractual clause or by execution of a negotiable note. "236 In the absence of a
direct statute, however, the language of this "buyer of consumer goods" ex-
ception proved to be ambiguous. In particular, questions arose as to whether
section 9-206(1) applied to consumer transactions in the absence of "any
statute or decision," and whether it warranted the establishment of a different
rule by way of a new judicial precedent.'" In any event, the interpretation of
section 9-206(1) did not play a substantial role in the development of rules
designed to protect consumers from the cut-off devices.
The strongest challenge to the effectiveness of cut-off devices in consumer
transactions concerned the financer's status as a good faith purchaser of the
retail paper. Since cut-off devices worked only in favor of a good faith pur-
chaser,'" this challenge could avoid altogether the doctrinal recognition of cut-
off devices by the Code. Thus, under what came to be known as the "close con-
nectedness" doctrine, a financer in consumer goods transactions could be
denied a holder in due course status in certain situations, such as:
. when it appears from the totality of the arrangement between dealer
and financer that the financer has had a substantial voice in setting stand-
ards for the underlying transaction, or has approved the standards
established by the dealer, and has agreed to take all or a predetermined or
substantial quantity of the negotiable paper which is backed by such stand-
ards . . . 239
In some cases, close business association provided the financer with access to
266 U.C.C. S 9-206(1)1. The general rule of S 9 -206(1) is set forth in the text and note
222 supra. "Consumer goods" in Article 9 of the Code are goods "used or sought for use primari-
ly for personal, family or household purposes." See U .0 .C. S 9 - 109(1).
236 U.C.C. 5 9-206(1) comment 2.
232 See generally Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 518, 523-24 (1971).
266 See text and note at note 222 supra.
239 Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 122-23, 232 A.2d 405, 417 (1967). See also Morgan v.
Reasor Corp., 69 Cal.2d 881, 447 P.2d 638, 73 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1968); Jones v. Approved Ban-
credit Corp., 256 A.2d 739 (Del. 1969); Calvert Credit Corp. v. Williams, 244 A.2d 494 (D.C.
App. 1968); Westfield Inv. Co. v. Feller, 74 N.J. Super. 575, 181 A.2d 809 (1962); American
Plan Corp. v. Woods, 16 Ohio App.2d 1, 240 N.E.2d 886 (1968). The landmark case is Com-
mercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940), in fact preceded by Buffalo
Indus. Bank v. DeMarzio, 162 Misc. 742, 296 N.Y.S. 783 (Buffalo City Ct.), rev'd on other
grounds, 6 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Sup. Ct. 1937). In general for "close connectedness" elements and
case law, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 479 -84 (1st ed. 1972); Axelrod & Barry, Holder in Due Course—A Memo M Poverty
Lawyers, 22 RUT. L. REV. 281, 294-95 (1968) (a summary of "the fairly common features of
[seller-financer] relations used in varying combinations in [cases]"); Ivan & Kristine Feltham,
Retail Installment of Sales Financing, 40 CAN. B. REV. 461, 479-81 (1962) (summarizing the
elements under American case law) [hereinafter cited as Feltham]; Comment, Judicial and
Statutory Limitations on the Rights of a 'Holder in Due Course' in Consumer Transaction, 11 B.C. IND. &
COM. L. REV. 90, 99 (1969).
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knowledge of the seller's business practices."° In denying holder in due course
status to the financer who willfully had shut his eyes to such knowledge, courts
applied well-established standards of good faith."' In other instances, not-
withstanding the injection of some objective elements to the "good faith"
standard under the Code,'" the close connectedness doctrine frequently was
seen as modifying the test of "good faith. "243 This author has argued elsewhere
that the doctrine is not concerned with the "good faith" of the financer, but
rather with his status as a "good faith purchaser" and that as such it "is an ap-
plication of the spirit of the old distinction between a remote and immediate
party ... "244 In cases involving close connectedness, "rather than being a pur-
chaser of the instrument after its execution, [the financer is] to all intents and
purposes a party to the agreement and the instrument from the beginning. "245
The doctrine applies whenever "the seller contemplated that credit would in
fact be advanced by, and the note in fact held by the particular financing in-
stitution involved. "245 Thus, having been involved in the arrangement from its
inception, the financer is not a "remote party" who could be a holder in due
course.
The Ontario Court of Appeal in Federal Discount Corp. Ltd. v. St. Pi erre, 247
introduced the "close connectedness" doctrine to Canada. It has since become
known as the "Federal Discount Doctrine. A,2413 Relying on American cases, 249 the
court in Federal Discount noted both the financer's exercise of "a measure of
control over the seller's sales by the requirements laid down with regard to the
negotiable paper" and the intimate relationship between seller and financer."°
'40 See, e.g., Norman v. World Wide Distributors, Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115
(1963).
"' See text and note at note 197 supra.
242 See definition of "notice" in U.C.C. $ 1-201(25). Cf. Kaw Valley State Bank &
Trust Co. v. Riddle, 219 Kan. 550, 549 P.2d 927 (1976).
243
 A favorable account of this development is presented by Littlefield, Good Faith Pur-
chase of Consumer Paper: The Failure of the Subjective Test, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 48 (1966).
244 Geva, Close Business Relationship Between A Purchase-Monty Lender and A Seller of Goods, 3
CAN. Bus. L. J. 90, 100 (1978).
245 Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 1077, 137 S.W.2d 260, 262 (1940)
(emphasis added). The phrase "participant in the arrangement" should have substituted the ex-
pression "party to the agreement" in the citation. For a critical view of the closely connected
financer's pretention to qualify as a remote party holder in due course, see McEwen, Economic
Issues in State Regulation of Consumer Credit, 8 B.C. INn. & Com, L. REV, 387, 401 (1967); Com-
ment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L.
REV. 395, 414 (1966).
246 Morgan v. Reasor Corp., 69 Cal. 2d 881, 895, 447 P.2d 638, 647 73 Cal. Rptr. 398,
407 (1968).
247 32 D.L.R.2d 86 (Ont. CA. 1962), commented on in Feltham, supra note 239. Proximity
to the underlying transaction precluded the financer from becoming a holder in due course under
the traditional test of "good faith" in Traders Fin. Corp., Ltd. v. Vanroboys [1955] 4 D.L.R.
337 (Ont. H.C.), and Circle Acceptance Corp. Ltd. v. Sigouin, [1963] S.C. 97 (Que.), commented
on by Black, Circle Acceptance Corp. Ltd. v, Sigouin, 10 McGit,t, L, J. 172 (1964).
248 See, e.g., Bank of Montreal v. Kan, 82 D.L.R.3d 609, 630 (Alta. S.C.T.D. 1978).
249 32 D.L.R.2d 86, 100.
25 ° Id, at 98, 99.
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Consequently, the court refused to see the financer as a holder in due course."'
"To pretend that [the financer and seller] were so separate that the transfer of
each note constituted an independent commercial transaction not affected by the
pre-existing arrangements between them would . . . be to permit the form to
prevail over the substance. ,,252
American cases applying the close connectedness doctrine all involved a
consumer who had been "reamed, steamed and dry cleaned" by his seller.'"
Unica v. Owen, a leading case, however, "reserve[d] specifically the question
whether, when the buyer's claim is breach of warranty as distinguished from
failure of consideration, the seller's default as to the former may be raised as a
defense against the financer. "254 This appears to be in line with pre-Code case
law which held that in the absence of fraud, an assignee claiming the benefit of
a waiver of defense clause was not subject to defenses arising from breach of
warranty by the seller.'" Yet, this revival of the "breach of warranty in the
absence of fraud" rule is erroneous. While the rule could be revived for con-
sumer transactions under U.C.C. section 9-206(1)' s" 6 provision permitting "a
different rule for buyers . . of consumer goods," its revival in the general
context of denying a financer "good faith purchaser" status is unwarranted.
The U.C.C. is quite explicit in providing that one not a holder in due course,
as well as an assignee who cannot enforce a waiver of defense clause, is subject
to all the contractual defenses of the obligor."' Obviously, breach of warranty
falls into this category. As such it is a defense available to the obligor against
every assignee who is neither a holder in due course nor one who can enforce a
waiver of defense clause, whether or not the breach of warranty is based on
fraud.
The question of financers' exposure to the breach of warranty defense is
quite complex in Canada. Under Anglo-Canadian law the traditional view is
that the failure of consideration in a sum uncertain, i.e., the breach of warran-
ty, is not available as a defense against a remote party holder not in due course
of a promissory note."' At the same time, under Canadian law, an assignee of
a conditional sale contract who cannot enforce a waiver of defense clause is
subject to all contractual defenses including the breach of warranty.'" The
251
	
at 100.
252 Id. at 99-100 (emphasis added).
253
	
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 239, at 483.
254 Unico v. Owen, 50 N. J. 101, 123, 232 A.2d 405, 417 (1967).
255
	 text and note at note 221 supra.
256 See text and notes at notes 235-37 supra.
257
	 C §§ 3-306(b), 3-408 and 9-318(1). None of these provisions have changed pre-
Code law.
"8 FALCONBRIDGE, supra note 197, at 620. A recent decision to the contrary is Edcal In-
dus. Agents Ltd. v. Redl & Zimmer, 60 D.L.R.2d 289, (Alta. S.C., App. Div. 1966). For a
detailed analysis and criticism see Geva, Equities as to Liability on Bills and Notes, 5 CAN. BUS. L. J.
53 (1980).
259 The position of an assignee (who is not the beneficiary of a waiver of defense clause)
with respect to obligor's defenses is discussed in the text and notes at notes 46-47, 53 supra.
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availability of the defense of breach of warranty against an assignee may
therefore depend on whether the latter does not sue on the obligor's promissory
note.
A few courts in the United States have revived the doctrine of "no
negotiability by contract " 26° to supplement the doctrine of close-connectedness
in consumer transactions. This doctrine was particularly helpful to consumers
in situations falling outside the close-connectedness doctrine. Equally helpful to
such consumers was the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Range v.
Belvedere Finance Corp. where the court found a promissory note separated by a
perforated line from a conditional sale contract not to be a negotiable
instrument. 261
 The Court distinguished its earlier decision in Killoran v. Mon-
ticello State Bank, 262
 upholding the use of a similar instrument, on the ground
that the sale contract in Belvedere Finance did not contain a waiver of defense
clause.
This line of cases, both in the United States and in Canada, is entirely un-
satisfactory. American courts have failed to respond to the criticism of the "no
negotiability by contract" theory. 263
 The realization that there is nothing in
Article 3 of the U.C.C. which inhibits the development of negotiable in-
struments outside of the Code's framework seems to have escaped American
courts. 264
 Similarly, the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Belvedere
Finance failed to realize that the majority in Killoran had based its decision
upholding the use of a cut-off device on the independence of the promissory
note in relation to the contract irrespective of the presence of a waiver of
defense clause. 265
 The most serious shortcoming of these American and Cana-
dian attacks on the effectiveness of the cut-off devices, however, is the ease with
which they can be circumvented by proper draftsmanship. Thus, the use of a
separate promissory note could protect financers in the United States, while the
inclusion of the waiver of defense clause in the accompanying conditional sale
contract could protect financers in Canada. Rather than challenge the underly-
ing premise of cut-off devices, this line of cases in the United States and
Canada presented a victory for the scheme upheld in Killoran: 266 a separate
promissory note and a waiver of defense clause in the conditional sale contract
260
 See text and note at note 212, supra. Cases in this direction include Fairfield Credit
Corp. v. Donnelly, 158 Conn. 543, 264 A.2d 547 (1969), commented on in Note, The Status of UCC
$ 9-206 - The Waiver of Defense Clause, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 687 (1970); Geiger Fin. Co. v.
Graham, 123 Ga. App. 771, 182 S.E.2d 521 (1971), commented on in 23 MERCER L. REV. 673
(1972); Unica v. Owen, supra note 239, 50 N.J. at 123-26, 232 A.2d at 417-18; Dean v. Univer-
sal C.I.T, Credit Corp., 114 N.J. Super. 132, 275 A.2d 154 (1971).
261
 Range v. Belvedere Fin. Corp., 5 D.L.R. 3d 257 (S.C.C. 1969).
262
 See text and notes at notes 229-32 supra.
2" See text and note at note 213-15 supra.
264
 In setting the elements of negotiability, unlike the N.I.L. s. 1 (see note 213
supra),U.C.C. 3-104(1) provides: "Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this Article
must . ." (emphasis added). This language does not preclude the possibility of "negotiable in-
struments" outside Article 3.
265 Range is persuasively criticized by Ziegel, supra note 206.
266
 See text and notes at notes 229-32 supra.
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could insulate the financer from consumer defenses so long as he could qualify
as a good faith purchaser of the retail paper.
One judicial doctrine did develop which attacked the very principle on
which the cut-off devices are based. The power of the judiciary to refuse to en-
force contractual terms which are contrary to public policy or uncon-
scionable 267
 suggested a framework for the evolution of a comprehensive theory
of consumer protection against cut-off devices. 268
 As one American court stated
in another context, "[u]nconscionability has generally been recognized to in-
clude an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together
with contract terms which are unreasonably favourable to the other party. ”269
According to Professor Kripke, a contract containing a cut-off device "is a con-
tract adhesion—a form contract proposed by the seller on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis . . [which has] appropriately been called private legislation. " 270
 Also,
in executing either a promissory note or a conditional sale contract containing a
waiver of defense clause, the typical consumer "is unaware of the consequence
of signing. " 271
 Unconscionability, or public policy, thus appeared to provide a
basis for invalidating the use of cut-off devices. 272
A few courts did apply the doctrine and ruled against the effectiveness of
cut-off devices in consumer transactions irrespective of the existence or the
absence of a financer-seller close business relationship."' Strong policy
counterarguments were made in support of the cut-off devices, however, and
therefore, against the application of unconscionability. In particular, the
devices were defended on the grounds that a financer "is only a source of
credit," and that the elimination of the cut-off devices would raise the price of
credit and thus, deny it to poor consumers. 274
 In this framework, disclosure of
267
 See U.C.C. S 2-302. For a summary of unconscionability from a Canadian perspec-
tive, see ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION, I REPORT ON SALE OF GOODS 153 (1979).
268
 Such a rule could indeed easily be "a different rule for buyers ... of consumer
goods" under U.C.C. S 9-206(1).
269
 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
270
 Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L. REV.
445, 472 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Kripke, Consumer Credit]. See also Elridge, The Holder-in-Due-
Course Concept and the Installment Buyer of Consumer Goods, 6 U. MO.-KANSAS CITY L. REV. 368,
376 (1968); Murphy, Another "Assault Upon the Citadel:" Limiting the Use of Negotiable Now and
Waiver-of-Defense Clauses in Consumer Sales, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 667, 670-71 (1968).
271
 Kripke, Consumer Credit, supra note 270, at 472.
2" See, e.g., Note, Waiver of Defense Clauses in Consumer Financing 15 S.D.L. REV. 386
(1970). In the United States the unintelligent and unknowing waiver of defenses by consumers
was challenged also constitutionally. See Reed, Assignment and Negotiation: A Violation of Due Process,
10 DuQ. L. REV. 92 (1971). The challenge failed in Hardy v. Gissendaner, 508 F.2d 1207 (5th
Cir. 1975).
273 See cases cited in note 260 supra (except for Geiger Fin. Co. v. Graham). Cf. Tiger
Motor Co. v. McMurtry, 284 Ala. 283, 224 So. 2d 638 (1969), commented on in Comment, Equity
Jurisdiction of Installment Sales: New Protection for Consumers in Alabama, 1 Cum.-SAM. L. REV, 291
(1970)) (invoking equitable jurisdiction in favor of a consumer maker of a note but tying the con-
sumer's remedy to the reimbursement of the financer-holder in due course by the seller).
"4
 For a summary of the pro and con policy arguments, see Felsenfeld, Some Ruminations
About Remedies in Consumer-Credit Transactions, 8 B.C. [ND. & COM. L. REV. 535, 550-51 (1967).
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the effect of cut-off devices was suggested as the proper remedy to consumers'
ignorance. 2"
Overall, abstract doctrines and principles of law, side by side with
simplistic policy arguments, failed to resolve the issue of financers' exposure to
consumer defenses. Cases considering the application of unconscionability as
well as the close connectedness doctrine became increasingly inconsistent.'"
There was a growing awareness that the issue of preservation of consumer
defenses is a question of risk allocation 277 which should be resolved by legisla-
tion. Thus, the way was paved for legislative intervention, in both the United
States and Canada.
C. The Effect of Consumer Protection Legislation
While differing in details, state statutes in the United States uniformly in-
validate or restrict the effect of cut-off devices. They are also virtually uniform
in limiting the financer's exposure to consumer defenses to the amount
outstanding at the time he receives notification of the defenses. 278 Even an Il-
linois state statute addressing an assignee's exposure to "any defense or right
of action, " 279 was not read by the court as providing for an assignee's affirm-
ative liability. The court observed that:
2" This was the original position of the American F.T.C. In re All-State Indus. of N.C.,
Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) '1 18,740, reproduced in H. KRIPKE, CONSUMER CREDIT: TEXT-
CASES-MATERIALS 248 (1970). Later the F.T.C. ruled against the effectiveness of the cut-off
devices. See text and notes at notes 286-87 infra.
276 Cut-off devices were upheld in the United States (on either or both the narrow con-
struction of the close connectedness doctrine or the rejection of unconscionability in Block v. Ford
Motor Credit Co., 286 A.2d 228 (D.C. 1972); Personal Fin. Co. v. Meredith, 39 El. App.3d
695, 350 N.E.2d 781 (1976); and Holt v. First Nat'l Bank, 297 Minn. 457, 214 N.W.2d 698
(1973). For more decisions and a discussion of this issue, see Rohner, Holder in Due Course in Con-
sumer Transactions: Requiem, Revival or Refonnation?, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 503, 517-21 (1975). Un-
conscionability has never been considered judicially in the context of cut-off devices in Canada. A
Canadian case upholding the effectiveness of cut-off devices (by narrowly construing the close
connectedness doctrine) is Prudential Fin. Corp. v. Kucheran, 45 D.L.R.2d 402 (Ont. C.A.
1964), commented on by Kessner, Prudential Finance Corporation v. Kucheran et al., 11 MCGILL Li .
386 (1965). See also Trader Fin. Corp. Ltd. v. Edmonton Airport Hotel Co. Ltd., 49 W.W.R. 56
(Alta. A.D., 1964); McMillan, Bills and Notes—Whether Close Relationship Between Retailer and
Finance Company such that Latter not Entitled to Claim is Holder in Due Course, 4 ALTA. L. REV. 166
(1965)). See generally Crawford, Consumer Installment Sales Financing Since Federal Discount Ltd. v. St.
Pierre, 19 U. TORONTO L.J. 353 (1969); Ziegel, Recent Legislative and Judicial Trends in Consumer
Credit in Canada, 8 ALTA. L. REV. 59, 70-71 (1969). See also Bank of Montreal v. Kon, 82
D.L.R.3d 609 (Alta. S.C.T.D., 1978) (direct loan case narrowly construing the close con-
nectedness doctrine).
2" For a detailed policy analysis, see Geva, Optimality and Preservation of Consumer
Defenses—A Model for Reform, 31 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 51 (1980).
2" For state statutes in the United States see Geva, Preservation of Consumer Defenses Against
Third Party Financiers: Statutory Developments in the United States, in PAPERS AND COMMENTS
DELIVERED AT THE EIGHTH ANNUAL WORKSHOP ON COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW
(Toronto, 1978) 72, 75 U. Ziegel ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Geva]. An extended assignee's
exposure is nonetheless provided for in N. J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:16c-38.2, 17:16c-64.2 (West 1970
& Supp. 1981).
279
 Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, (ILL. REV, STAT, ch. 121%2 §262D (1971).
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The statute is designed only to operate in the context of an assignment
. . . As such, it is really the debt assigned which is subject to the buyer's
defenses and rights of action, although it is against the assignee who holds
the instrument acknowledging the debt that the buyer must assert his
claims. In no case, therefore, should the assignee's liability exceed the
amount owed to him. 28°
Thus, the assignee could not be liable in excess of the outstanding debt.
State statutes did not purport to affect common law principles governing
the assignee-obligor relationship."' They were designed merely to invalidate
the cut-off devices. Emphasizing the assignee's lack of affirmative liability,
some statutes added that "Mlle rights of the buyer . . . can only be asserted as
a matter of defense to a claim by the assignee. ,282 This approach, however,
turned out to be unfortunate in connection with a consumer's action to rescind
the contract. While not charging the assignee with affirmative liability, such an
action is brought by the obligor against the assignee as defendant. The action
cannot be said to be asserted "as a matter of defense" to the assignee's claim.
In this context one court observed that "[jilt would be ironic indeed if a provi-
sion in an act intended to benefit consumers could be invoked to their detri-
ment to such an extent that they would stand in a less advantageous position
than others in the commercial arena." 283 Nonetheless, the court went no fur-
ther than to repudiate the effect of the provision against an assignee with notice
of the defenses, as well as against an assignee closely associated with the
seller. 284 In this framework, an assignee who is a "bona fide purchaser" ap-
pears to hold the retail paper free from the buyer's action of rescission.
However, the question can be raised whether the assignee is not in any event
bound by the buyer's effective rescission as against the seller. One state statute
explicitly permits the consumer to assert his defenses against the assignee as a
"sword" to rescind the contract. 285
State provisions in the United States recently have been preempted by a
regulation issued by the Federal Trade Commission. 286 The regulation nullifies
the effect of the holder in due course doctrine as well as the waiver of defense
280 Household Fin. Corp. v. Mowdy, 13 111. App. 3d 822, 828-29, 300 N.E.2d 863, 867
(1973).
lei
	 these principles see text and notes at notes 38-184 supra.
202 California Unruh Act, CAL. Civ. CODE, 5 1804.2 (amended 1971) (West 1973) (em-
phasis added). Other state statutes containing a similar provision, according to Hudak & Carter,
The Erosion of the Holder in Due Course Doctrine: Historical Perspective and Development— Part II, 9
U.C.C. L.J. 235, 243-48 (1977) include ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 5544-145, 44- 5005 (Sum).
1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. 55 16-a 3-307, 16-a 3-403, 16-a 3-404, 16-a 3-405 (1974); and Wyo.
STAT. 55 40-2-403, 40-2-404 (Supp. 1973). See also Uniform Consumer Credit Code 5 2.404,
Alternative A (1968 version).
283 Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 823-24, 484 P.2d 964, 979 (1971) (com-
menting on the California provision cited in note 282 supra).
2 B 4 Id. at 824, 484 P.2d at 980.
285 W. VA. CODE ANN. §5 46A 2-101, 46A 2-102, 46A 2-103 (Supp. 1974). "West
Virginia is the only state with this sword provision." Hudak & Carter, supra note 281, at 257.
286 16 C.F.R. 5 433.1-2 (1977). See generally Geva, supra note 278, at 84.
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clause in the consumer context. It does so by requiring a seller to include in a
"consumer credit contract" a provision stating that "any holder of this con-
sumer credit contract is subject to all claims and defenses" of the buyer, and
that "[r]ecovery hereunder . . shall not exceed amounts paid by the debtor
hereunder." 287 This F.T.C. rule thus goes beyond state statutes, as well as the
common law, 288 in providing for the consumer's right to recover past payments
from the assignee.
In Canada, legislation invalidating cut-off devices developed along the
lines set up by the overall distribution of legislative power. Section 91(1)(18) of
the British North American Act of 1867 assigned to the Parliament of Canada
the exclusive legislative power in relation to bills of exchange and promissory
notes. Under section 92(13) of this act, "matters coming within . . . property
and civil rights in the province" were assigned to the exclusive power of each
provincial legislature. 289 Accordingly, the Federal Parliament invalidated the
effect of the holder in due course doctrine in connection with bills and notes, 299
and provincial legislatures invalidated the effect of the waiver of defense
clause. 29 '
Federal and provincial legislation in Canada provide different rules with
regard to the financer's exposure to consumer defenses. 292 Under federal law, a
holder of a consumer bill or note is subject only to the consumer's right to
withhold payment. 293 Most provinces, however, provide that the seller's
287
 16 C.F.R. § 433.2(a). "Consumer credit contract" is broadly defined in C.F.R. §
433.1(1) to include "[a]ny instrument which evidences or embodies a debt arising from . . . a
'financed sale'." This definition includes the contract for sale as well as a promissory note given
thereunder.
288 See text and notes at notes 278-81, supra. The rule is, however, roughly consistent
with the recommendation of the NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, 17 CON-
SUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES, 35, 36 (1972) (financer's exposure to consumer
defenses up to original amount financed).
289
 The distribution of legislative powers is governed in Canada by the Constitution Act,
1867 (formerly named the British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3 (as amended)).
29° CAN. REV. STAT. 1970 (1st Supp.), enacting Part V of the Bills of Exchange Act
(CAN. REV. STAT. 1970, C.B.'5).
291 Alberta, Alta. REV. STAT. 1980, c. L-8, s. 48; British Columbia, B.C. REV. STAT.
1979 c.65 (as amended), s. 3 (has not been proclaimed in force yet); Manitoba, MAN. REV.
STAT. 1970, c.C200 (as amended), s. 67; New Brunswick, N.B. REV. STAT. 1973, c.C-28 (as
amended), s. 22; Newfoundland, NFLD. REV. STAT. 1970 c.256 (as amended), s. 22A; Nova
Scotia, N.S. REV, STAT. 1967, c53/C-38 (as amended), s. 20B; Ontario, ONT. REV. STAT. 1980
C.87, s. 31; Prince Edward Island, P.E.I. REV. STAT. 1974, c.C-17 (as amended), s. 23;
Quebec, QUE. STAT. 1978 c.9 (as amended), s. 103; Saskatchewan, SASK. REV, STAT. 1978
c.C-41 (as amended), s. 17.
292 For Canadian legislation on the preservation of consumer defenses see I. BAXTER,
THE LAW OF BANKING 108-13 (3d ed. 1981); Buglass, Recent Judicial and Legislative Developments in
Canada, in PAPERS AND COMMENTS DELIVERED AT THE EIGHTH ANNUAL WORKSHOP ON
COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW (Toronto, 1978) 39 (J. Ziegel ed. 1980); Milrod, Pan V of
the Bills of Exchange Act: Effective Consumer Protection Legislation?, 12 OTTAWA L. REV. 319 (1980);
Geva, Preservation of Consumer Defenses: Statutes and Jurisdiction, 32 U. OF TORONTO L.J. 176
(1982).
293 Section 191 of the Bills of Exchange Act speaks of the assignee's subjection "to any
defence . . . that the purchaser would have had in an action by the seller . . . "
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assignee is either responsible, 294 liable, 295 or exposed to recovery 296 up to the
balance due at the time of the assignment.
Receivables financers in the United States and assigness of sale
agreements (but not holders of negotiable instruments issued in payment
thereunder) in most Canadian provinces are thus exposed to some affirmative
liability. In the United States, this exposure is limited to the entire value of the
"consumer credit contract." 297 In the Canadian provinces, the limitation is set
by the balance owing under the contract at the time of the assignment. For ex-
ample, under s.31(2) of the Ontario Consumer Protection Act, 2" the obligor
"shall not recover from, or be entitled to, set off against an assignee . . . an
amount greater than the balance owing on the contract at the time of the
assignment." The assignee's exposure consists of three elements. First, it
reflects the consumer's right to withhold payment or "to set off. " 299 Second, it
represents amounts paid to the assignee after the buyer receives notification of
the assignment. Third, it could include amounts paid to the seller after assign-
ment but before notification. 3" No greater sum is recoverable from the
assignee. 30 ' In the United States, exposure to amounts paid under the "con-
sumer credit contract" includes a fourth element: amounts paid to the seller
prior to the assignment.
Subjecting the assignee to more than the consumer's right to withhold
payment represents a departure from the common law position with respect to
the assignee-obligor relationship. 302 Yet, inasmuch as a financing assignee is
not a "bona fide purchaser" of receivables generated in a consumer transac-
tion, 303 his exposure to a limited affirmative liability is consistent with the view
that the assignee's good faith is the basis for the lack of duty on his part to
294 QUE. REV. STAT. 1978 c.9 (as amended), s. 103.
295 NFLD. REV, STAT. 1970 c.256 (as amended, s. 22A; N.S REV. STAT. 1967, c53/C-38
(as amended), s. 20B; P.E.I. REV. STAT. 1974, c.C-17 (as amended), s. 23.
296 ONT. REV. STAT. 1980 C.87, s. 31; SASK. REV. STAT. 1978 c.C-41 (as amended), s.
17.
29'
	 text and note at note 287 supra.
298
 ONT. REV. STAT. 1980 C.87, s. 31.
299 "Set off" is used here in the sense of the American "recoupment." See text and
notes at notes 65-66 supra. In English law such "set off" is more properly called "equitable set
off." Morgan and Son Ltd. v. S. Martin Johnson 8c Co. Ltd., [1949] 1 K.B. 107 (C.A.). It is to
be distinguished from the statutory right of set off which relates to a right to a debt in a liquidated
sum of money arising outside the assigned contract.
300 After assignment, but before notification, the account debtor is to pay the assignor.
U.C.C. § 9-318(3), Ont. P.P.S.A. s. 40(2). The assignee's exposure to amounts so paid to the
seller was explicitly omitted in Ontario in relation to the assignee's liability for the seller's
misleading, deceptive, or unconscionable consumer representation. See s. 4(4) of the Business
Practices Act ONT. REV. STAT. 1980 c.55: "the liability of an assignee . . . is limited to the
amount paid to the assignee under the agreement."
30 ' Ont. CPA s. 31 should not be construed as entitling the consumer to recover more
than he has actually paid since the assignment. What is limited in s. 31 "to the balance'owing
. . " is the right to "recover . . . or . . . set off" (emphasis added), not the right to recover in
addition to the right of set off.
3°' See text and notes at notes 63-68 supra.
'"" See text and notes at notes 238-46 supra.
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return past payments. 304 The implication of this view is that in the absence of
"good faith," the assignee could be subject to return payments made to him by
the obligor under a mistake of fact as to the seller's performance.
Subjecting an assignee "to the same obligations, liabilities and duties as
the assignor," presently the rule in five Canadian provinces, 305 goes further
than invalidating the waiver of defense clause 306 or extending the amount of the
financer's exposure to liability. Section 103 of the new Quebec Consumer Pro-
tection Act307 goes so far as to provide that the seller's assignee "is jointly and
severally responsible with the merchant for the performance of the merchant's
obligations. . . " 3" Such language undermines altogether the common law
scheme which governs the assignee-obligor's relationship.'" The assignee
becomes involved in the seller-buyer's contractual relationship. Thus, he could
be entitled to certain notices as well as be authorized to act thereunder.
Arguably, he could terminate or rescind the contract, and would not be subject
to the modification of the contract by the original parties thereto. 310
In some situations the effect of such a rule would be proper. For example,
the right to rescind the contract for buyer's misrepresentation as to his solvency
should belong not to the seller but rather to the assignee who had been con-
templated as the credit extender and was thus, in fact, the misrepresentee. 3 "
Nonetheless, the overall rationale of the new order and its indiscriminate ap-
plication to the entire scope of the financing assignee-obligor's relationship is
far from clear. Provincial legislatures in Canada subverted the common law
scheme and undermined altogether the "agency for collection" theory without
resolving specific issues which are bound to arise, and without engaging in a
policy discussion designed to illuminate the emerging new order and its reach.
This state of affairs does not reflect a wise use of legislative powers.
CONCLUSION
Under the common law as well as under modern commercial legislation in
the United States and Canada, the seller's assignee takes the contract for sale
subject to the buyer's defenses. Nonetheless, vis-a-vis the buyer, the financing
assignee is a "mere agent for collection." He does not step into the seller-
3" See text and notes at notes 132, 159-60 supra.
3 ° 5
 Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, and Saskatchewan.
Statutes are cited in note 291 supra.
3°6
 A provision which merely invalidates the effect of the waiver of defense clause in con-
sumer transactions is s. 16 of the Ontario P.P.S.A. (ONT. REV. STAT. 1980 c.375) as well as of
the Manitoba P.P.S.A (MAN. REV. STAT. 1973 c.5/P 35 (as amended)).
1" QUE. STAT. 1978 c.9 (as amended), s. 103.
3° Id.
3° See text and notes at notes 38-184 supra.
11 ° Cf. text and notes at notes 92-123 supra.
311 Cf. text and notes at notes 98.102 supra; Benfield, supra note 87, at 21.
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buyer's contractual relationship. The assignee is in "the exact position" of the
seller312 only with respect to the buyer's right to withhold payments.
To avoid subjection to the buyer's defenses, financing assignees adopted
the use of the promissory note and the waiver of defense clause in the condi-
tional sale contract. In connection with consumer transactions, such devices
were disfavored by American and Canadian courts. However, abstract doc-
trines and principles of law failed to effectively preserve consumer defenses. Ef-
fective protection could be accomplished only by legislation. Federal regulation
in the United States and provincial legislation in Canada now go beyond the
preservation of consumer defenses and provide for a limited assignee's affirm-
ative liability. Canadian provincial legislation subjects the assignee to the
seller's "obligations, liabilities and duties," and in one instance even makes
assignees responsible "for the performance of the merchant's obligations.' ' 3 "
Such language contemplates the assignee's involvement in the performance of
the assigned contract and undermines altogether the common law scheme gov-
erning the assignee-obligor's relationship.
Cf text and note at note 2 supra.
I 3 See text and notes at notes 304-06 supra.
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Appendix
1	 Commercial law legislation governing the financing assignee's rights
(a) U.C.C. (1972 Official Text) 9-318
(1) Unless an account debtor has made an enforceable agreement
not to assert defenses or claims arising out of a sale as provided in Sec-
tion 9-206 the rights of an assignee are subject to
(a) all the terms of the contract between the account debtor and
assignor and any defense or claim arising therefrom; and
(b) any other defense or claim of the account debtor against the
assignor which accrues before the account debtor receives
notification of the assignment.
(2) So far as the right to payment or a part thereof under an
assigned contract has not been fully earned by performance, and not-
withstanding notification of the assignment, any modification of or
substitution for the contract made in good faith and in accordance with
reasonable commercial standards is effective against an assignee unless
the account debtor has otherwise agreed but the assignee acquires cor-
responding rights under the modified or substituted contract. The
assignment may provide that such modification or substitution is a
breach by the assignor.
(3) The account debtor is authorized to pay the assignor until the
account debtor receives notification that the amount due or to become
due has been assigned and that payment is to be made to the assignee.
A notification which does not reasonably identify the rights assigned is
ineffective. If requested by the account debtor, the assignee must
seasonably furnish reasonable proof that the assignment has been made
and unless he does so the account debtor may pay the assignor.
(4) A term in any contract between an account debtor and an
assignor is ineffective if it prohibits assignment of an account or pro-
hibits creation of a security interest in a general intangible for money
due or to become due or requires the account debtor's consent to such
assignment or security interest.
(b) Ontario Personal Property Security Act. s. 40
(1) Unless an account debtor has made an enforceable agreement
not to assert defenses or claims arising out of a sale as provided by sec-
tion 16, the rights of an assignee are subject to,
(a) all the terms of the contract between the account debtor and
the assignor and any defense or claim arising therefrom; and
(b) any other defense or claim of the account debtor against the
assignor that accrued before the account debtor received
notice of the assignment.
(2) The account debtor may pay the assignor until the account
debtor receives notice, reasonably indentifiable with the relevant rights,
that the account has been assigned, and, if requested by the account debt-
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or, the assignee shall furnish proof within a reasonable time that the
assignment has been made, and, if he does not do so, the account debtor
may pay the assignor.
2	 Provisions governing rights of a holder in due course
(a) U. C. C. 55 3-302(1), 3-305
§ 3-302 (1) A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument
(a) for value; and
(b) in good faith; and
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of
any defense against or claim to it on the part of any person.
§ 3-305 To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes the
instrument free from
(1) all claims to it on the part of any person; and
(2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the
holder has not dealt except
(a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple contract;
and
(b) such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the transac-
tion, as renders the obligation of the party a nullity; and
(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the in-
strument with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity
to obtain knowledge of its character or its essential terms; and
(d) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and
(e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when he
takes the instrument.
(b) The Bills of Exchange Act (Canada) ss. 56, 74(a), (b)
56. (1) A holder in due course is a holder who has taken a
bill, complete and regular on the fact of it, under the following
conditions, namely:
(a) that he became the holder of it before it was overdue and
without notice that it had been previously dishonored, if such
was the fact;
(b) that he took the bill in good faith and for value, and that at
the time the bill was negotiated to him he had no notice of any
defect in the title of the person who negotiated it.
(2) In particular the title of a person who negotiates a bill
is defective within the meaning of this Act when he obtained
the bill, or the acceptance thereof, by fraud, duress or force
and fear, or other unlawful means, or for an illegal considera-
tion, or when he negotiates it in breach of faith, or under such
circumstances as amount to a fraud.
74. The rights and powers of the holder of a bill are as
follows:
(a) he may sue on the bill in his own name;
(b) where he is a holder in due course, he holds the bill free
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from any defect of title of prior parties, as well as from mere
personal defenses available to prior parties among themselves,
and may enforce payment against all parties liable on the bill;
3 . Commercial law legislation governing the effect of a waiver of defense clause
(a) U. C. C. § 9-206(1)
Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different
rule for buyers or lessees of consumer goods, an agreement by a buyer
or lessee that he will not assert against an assignee any claim or
defense which he may have against the seller or lessor is enforceable by
an assignee who takes his assignment for value, in good faith and
without notice of a claim or defense, except as to defenses of a type
which may be asserted against a holder in due course of a negotiable
instrument under the Article on,,Commercial Paper (Article 3). A
buyer who as part of one transaction signs both a negotiable instru-
ment and a security agreement makes such an agreement.
(b) Ontario Personal Property Security Act, s. 16
Except as to consumer goods, an agreement by a debtor not to
assert against an assignee any claim or defence that he has against his
seller or lessor is enforceable by the assignee who takes the assignment
for value, in good faith and without notice, except as to such defences
as may be asserted against the holder in due course of a negotiable in-
strument under the Bills of Exchange Act (Canada).
4.	 The financing assignee under consumer protection laws
(a) FTC Rule: Preservation of Consumer Claims and Defenses, § 433.2
(United States)
In connection with any sale or lease of goods or services to con-
sumers, in or affecting commerce as "commerce" is defined in the
Federal Trade Commission Act, it is an unfair or deceptive act or
practice within the meaning of Section 5 of that Act for a seller, direct-
ly or indirectly, to:
(a) Take or receive a consumer credit contract which fails to
contain the following provision in at least ten point, bold face, type:
NOTICE
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CON-
TRACT IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE
SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED PUR-
SUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF.
RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR SHALL
NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR
HEREUNDER.
(b) Part V of the Bills of Exchange Act (Canada), ss. 190,191
190. (1) Every consumer bill or consumer note shall be pro-
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minently and legibly marked on its face with the words "Con-
sumer Purchase" before or at the time when the instrument is
signed by the purchaser or by any one signing to accommodate
the purchaser.
(2) A consumer bill or consumer note that is not marked
as required by this section is void, except in the hands of a holder
in due course without notice that the bill or note is a consumer
bill or consumer note or except as against a drawee without such
notice.
191. Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, the right
of a holder of a consumer bill or consumer note that is marked as
required by Section 190, to have the whole or any part thereof
paid by the purchaser or any party signing to accommodate the
purchaser is subject to any defence or right of set off, other than
counterclaim, that the purchaser would have had in an action by
the seller on the consumer bill or consumer note.
(c) Section 31 of the Ontario Consumer Protection Act
(1) The assignee of any rights of a lender has no greater rights
than and is subject to the same obligations, liabilities and duties as the
assignor, and the provisions of this Act apply equally to such assignee.
(2) Notwithstanding subsection 1, a borrower shall not recover
from, or be entitled to set-off against, an assignee of the lender an
amount greater than the balance owing on the contract at the time of
the assignment, and, if there have been two or more assignments, the
borrower shall not recover from an assignee who no longer holds the
benefit of the contract an amount that exceeds the payments made by
the borrower to that assignee.
Relevant Definitions (Section 1)
(b) "borrower" means a person who receives credit;
(f) "credit" means credit for which the borrower incurs a cost
of borrowing and,
(i) given under an agreement between a seller and a buyer
to purchase goods or services by which all or part of the
purchase price is payable after the agreement is entered
into, or
(ii) given by the advancement of money
(1) "lender" means a person who extends credit;
(d) Section 103 of the Quebec Consumer Protection Act
103. The assignee of a debt owed to a merchant under a contract
to which the latter is a party cannot have more rights than the
merchant and is jointly and severally responsible with the mer-
chant for the performance of the merchant's obligations up to the
amount of such debt at the time it is assigned to him or, if he
assigns it in turn, up to the amount of the payment he has re-
ceived.
BOSTON COLLEGE
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME XXIII	 MAY 1982
	
NUMBER 3
BOARD OF EDITORS
JANET L. HOFFMAN
Editor-in-Chief
JONATHAN M. ALBANO
Executive Editor
FREDERICK F. EISENBIEGLER
Executive Editor
CHARLES PURINTON SHIMER
Managing Editor for Production
LISA LEFEVRE DILUNA
Topics Editor
ANNE C. HABERLE
Citations Editor
MARCO ADELFIO
THOMAS L. BARRETTE, JR.
KEVIN MICHAEL CAROME
CHERI L. CROW
THOMAS P. DALE
LISA LEFEVRE DILUNA
STEVEN D. EIMERT
JOAN K. FINE
LAURENCE J. BIRD II
STEPHEN J. BRAKE
JANET CLAIRE CORCORAN
MICHAEL F. COYNE
KEVIN M. DENNIS
PAMELA M. DONNA
JANICE DUFFY
BARBARA J. EGAN
WARREN M. ERNST
ANNE L. GERO
EDWARD J. NEVILLE, III
Executive Editor — Annual
Survey of Massachusetts Law
THOMAS J. RAUBACH
Executive Editor — Annual
Survey of Massachusetts Law
CINDY A. LAQUIDARA
Managing Editor for Finance
DONALD M. KELLER, JR.
Solicitations Editor
JOHN M. HESSION
Citations Editor
Articles Editors
WILLIAM A. FRAGETTA
PETER E. GELHAAR
BARBARA ROHAN GILMORE
EDITH A. GOLDMAN
ANDREW C. GRIESINGER
ANNE C. HABERLE
JOHN M. HESSION
SECOND YEAR STAFF
STEPHEN V. GIMIGLIANO
EVANS HUBER
WILLIAM J. HUDAK, JR.
PETER E. HUTCHINS
DOUGLAS W. JESSOP
Jo M. KATZ
KEVIN J. LAKE
JAMES L. LAMOTHE, JR.
ROBERT J. LEBOEUF
GREGORY LIMONCELLI
JONATHAN E. MOSKIN
JEFFREY H. KARLIN
DONALD M. KELLER, JR.
CINDY A. LAQUIDARA
EDWARD J. NEVILLE, III
JOHN R. PIERCE
THOMAS J. RAUBACH
MARJORY D. ROBERTSON
CHARLES PURINTON SHIMER
ALBERT ANDREW NOTINI
MARK VINCENT Nucor()
SUSAN REARDAN O'NEILL
RAYMOND PELLETIER
MITCHELL P. PORTNOY
JON S. RAND
SHEREE S. UNG
DOUGLAS G. VERGE
MARI A. WILSON
ERIC G. WOODBURY
PETER A. DONOVAN
	 ROSALIND F. KAPLAN	 MICHELLE CALORE
Faculty Advisor	 Administrative Assistant 	 Secretary
